




Suppose that a case before a lower federal court turns on the
interpretation of a disputed precedent of the Supreme Court. As support for
their opposed interpretations, the litigants introduce various items of
"judicial history": internal drafts of the Supreme Court's opinion,
memoranda circulated among the Justices before publication of the opinion,
and other official documents culled from the vast body of publicly available
judicial materials.2 These documents, each litigant argues, demonstrate that
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1. Justices and judges accumulate two types of papers. "Working papers" are collections of
judicial records generated in the course of official business, such as draft opinions, legal
memoranda, and so forth. "Private papers" contain personal writings, journals, letters to family
and friends, and other documents related to life outside of the Court. See ALEXANDRA K.
WIGDOR, THE PERSONAL PAPERS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE 3
(1986). Here, the term "judicial history" will be used to denote only the subset of working papers
that is circulated among or accessible to all the members of a court, thereby including draft
opinions and legal memoranda from judges to the whole court, but excluding, for example,
memoranda to the judge from law clerks. "Judicial history" is suggested by analogy to the term
"legislative history," which denotes documents generated within legislatures during the process
of statutory enactment and legislative business generally, but does not cover private materials that
congressmen keep in their office files. The legal rules governing judicial-history materials are
simple: Unlike official legislative history and presidential records, which are (in large part)
government property subject to statutory restrictions, judicial papers are the property of the judge
and may be disposed of as the judge sees fit. Compare 44 U.S.C. §§ 2118-2207 (1991) (regulating
congressional and presidential records), with Public Papers of Supreme Court Justices: Assuring
Preservation and Access: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation and Gov't Info. of the
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 17 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen.
Lieberman) (noting that judicial papers are the private property of individual judges).
2. The controversy attendant upon the opening of Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers has
brought wide attention to that collection. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Guard Mystique; Anger
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the opinion's author and the Justices who joined the opinion intended to say
one thing rather than another, or that the best reading of the opinion's text
would embody that interpretation.
This proposed use of judicial history differs from the typical uses of
judicial materials. Historians, biographers, and journalists draw upon
judicial history to set an opinion in the context of its time or to illuminate
the internal workings of the Court's deliberative processes? Lawyers
preparing for argument before the Court have taken to studying the judicial
history of relevant recent precedents in order to gauge how sitting Justices
in High Court over Marshall Papers Is Fueled by More than Pomp and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 1993, at Al. But the Marshall Papers are only a small fraction of the whole corpus of
judicial materials. See WIGDOR, supra note 1, at 32-34 (identifying, as of 1986, 29 large
collections of Justices' papers, 12 medium-sized collections, and 28 small collections). There is
no central depository for these papers. Many collections are located at the Library of Congress in
Washington, D.C. The following Justices have established partially or wholly unrestricted
collections at the Library of Congress: Harry Blackmun, Louis D. Brandeis, Warren Burger (with
papers at The College of William & Mary as well), Harold H. Burton, Salmon P. Chase, David
Davis (also at the Chicago Historical Society), William Rufus Day, William 0. Douglas, Gabriel
Duvall, Oliver Ellsworth, Felix Frankfurter, Melville W. Fuller, John Marshall Harlan, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Robert H. Jackson, John Jay, Horace H. Lurton, Thurgood Marshall, John
McLean, William H. Moody, Rufus W. Peckham, Harlan Fiske Stone, Joseph Story, Noah Haynes
Swayne, William Howard Taft, and Earl Warren. The Library of Congress does not necessarily
have a complete collection for any of these Justices; for example, the Library's collections of
papers from Justices Brandeis and Holmes are small, while Harvard Law School has a large share
of their papers and Louisville School of Law has all of Brandeis's non-judicial materials.
Most collections of judicial-history materials are eventually opened to the public under the
terms of their donations, but collections of living Justices are in many cases restricted during their
lives and for a period of years thereafter. The Justices who have established restricted collections
at the Library of Congress are Hugo L. Black, William J. Brennan, William 0. Douglas, Robert H.
Jackson, Samuel Freeman Miller, Sandra Day O'Connor, Morrison Waite, and Byron R. White.
Justice White has said there will be no access during his life and for 10 years after his death, but
he has reserved the right to change his mind. Only some of Justice Douglas's papers are restricted
and those can be accessed by obtaining permission from his estate. The papers of Justices Black,
Jackson, Miller, and Waite are simply listed as "restricted or classified." To obtain access to the
Brennan Papers one must request a form and submit it to the executors of his estate, who
generally grant access for six-month blocks to those with a scholarly purpose. Justice O'Connor
will review requests personally but has noted that she is unlikely to grant them. Her papers will be
made available to scholars after her death, but no access will be given until all the Justices
involved in the cases covered have retired. In addition to the collections at the Library of
Congress, there are significant collections at Harvard Law School and other academic institutions.
Justice Tom Clark's papers are at Texas; Justice Abe Fortas's papers are at Yale; Justice Frank
Murphy's papers are at Michigan; Justice Lewis Powell's papers are at Washington & Lee; Justice
Stanley Reed's papers are at Kentucky; Justice Potter Stewart's papers are at Yale; and Chief
Justice Fred Vinson's papers are at Kentucky.
3. For some historical uses, see, for example, RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
683-85 (1976), which draws upon internal documents, such as a conference memorandum by
Justice Frankfurter, to sketch the background of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST
COURT 62-67 (1995), which uses draft opinions by Justices White, Kennedy, and Brennan to
analyze Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988); and Michael Klarman, An
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1991), which uses draft
opinions and conference notes to describe the development of equal protection doctrine. The
biographical use of judicial history began with ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE
STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956), which draws on Chief Justice Stone's working papers, and it
is now standard. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE
(1994) 287-343 (including an extensive discussion of pre-conference memoranda circulated
among judges on Second Circuit panels); see also infra notes 123-126 (citing scholarly sources).
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will react to possible lines of argument.4 These historical and predictive
uses of judicial history differ from the distinctively legal use proposed by
the litigants. They desire to introduce judicial history as an interpretive
source that will become part of the set of interpretive sources admissible to
explain an authoritative legal text.
Under current practice, this attempted use of judicial history would
receive no hearing. Federal courts5 do not consider the judiciary's internal
records as interpretive sources bearing on the meaning of published
opinions or judicially-promulgated rules.6 In accord with this entrenched
practice, current scholarship assumes that internal judicial materials are
useful only as historical documentation, rather than as legally admissible
authority. Mark Tushnet, for example, begins a paper on the Supreme
Court's civil rights jurisprudence by stating that "1l]awyers and historians
agree that almost everything we need to know about constitutional law is
found in the Supreme Court's published opinions. Internal Court
documents, like Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers, tell us something
about the dynamics within the Court but relatively little about constitutional
law." 7
Yet the twin assumptions that judicial history can provide no
interpretive aid and should not be consulted in the interpretation of
judicially-promulgated texts ought to be deeply puzzling. The backdrop for
these assumptions is a legal system that often interprets controlling legal
texts in the light of "official history": documents generated within the
institution that promulgated a disputed legal text during the course of the
text's creation.' Courts regularly consult originalist materials to construe
4. See Daniel Klaidman, Gold Mine or Land Mine?, Marshall Papers Could Alter High-
Court Litigation Strategy, CONN. L. TRIB., June 7, 1993, at 12 ("Many Washington law firms
have already sent teams of researchers to the Library of Congress' Reading Room to pore through
the more than 173,000 documents [in Thurgood Marshall's collection of internal Court papers].");
A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's Legacy of the Law of
Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REv. 13, 16 n.11 (1998) (noting that the author consulted the
Marshall Papers to develop a litigation position in a matter before the Supreme Court).
5. In this Essay, I shall generally confine the discussion to the possible use of judicial history
by federal courts to interpret decisions announced by, or rules promulgated by, other federal
courts-specifically in two possible situations: (1) the use of judicial history by the Supreme
Court to interpret its own prior opinions; and (2) the use of judicial history by lower federal courts
to interpret the opinions of the Supreme Court. Possible extensions of the discussion to state
courts, foreign jurisdictions, and other settings must await another day.
6. Judicially-promulgated rules fall into two categories: (1) the rules of procedure and
evidence that the Supreme Court promulgates under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-
2074 (1994); and (2) rules that federal courts promulgate to govern their operations, such as the
Supreme Court Rules. Subsequent references to "rules" refer to the former category; the latter for
the most part lack general significance.
7. Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-1991: The View
from the Marshall Papers, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 473, 473 (1995) (emphasis omitted); see
also Bruce Fein, An Abuse of Discretion, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 48 ("[Justice Thurgood
Marshall's] papers are irrelevant to the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court.").
8. Whether officials of a particular institution may be asked to testify about the official
history of their decisions is a different question altogether. Here too the rules present interesting
asymmetries. Under the Speech and Debate Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, and its state
analogues, legislators may generally not be compelled to testify about their official acts. In many
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constitutional text, legislative history to construe statutes, travaux
preparatoires (negotiating and drafting history) to construe treaties, and so
forth.9 In none of these domains do courts always consult internal materials;
the practice is in each case intermittent and subject to criticism.0
Nonetheless, that courts have at some times and under some circumstances
consulted internal materials across all of these domains throws the puzzling
exclusion" of internal judicial history into sharp relief.
And it seems clear that judicial history might, in at least some cases and
on some interpretive premises, provide the same sort of aid that the other
forms of official history are said to provide. Tushnet gives the example of
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 12 in which
Justice Rehnquist circulated a draft opinion that would have distinguished
white-collar from blue-collar workers for purposes of Title VII's ban on
racial discrimination in employment. After Justice Marshall circulated a
draft dissent, however, Rehnquist could not gain a majority for his own
jurisdictions they may not even do so voluntarily. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and
the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1833, 1890 n.195 (1998) (collecting federal and state sources). Judges may not testify either. See
Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306-07 (1904) (holding that the meaning of a judicial order
could not be proved by introducing the testimony of the judge who wrote the order); cf United
States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (citing Fayerweather to support the holding that the
Secretary of Agriculture could not be called to testify regarding his official decisions). Executive
officials subordinate to the President, however, may be compelled to testify in unusual
circumstances. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)
(holding that a trial court may require administrative officials to testify in the absence of formal
findings when such findings are required to issue a regulation).
9. Recent examples of these uses are as follows. For originalism, see Printz v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 2365, 2372-79 (1997), which consults The Federalist Nos. 15, 27, 28, 33, 36, 39, 44,
45, 51, 70 to adjudicate a commandeering challenge to a federal statute. For legislative history,
see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1226 (1998), which consults the
legislative history of a criminal statute to uphold its constitutionality as a sentencing factor. For
travaux, see Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996), which states:
"Because a treaty ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land, see U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, but also an agreement among sovereign powers, we have traditionally considered as
aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history (travaux preparatoires) and the post-
ratification understanding of the contracting parties."
10. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1885-96 (arguing that judges should not resort to
legislative history in statutory interpretation).
11. The term "exclusion" is used here only as convenient shorthand for a long-winded
description of the status of internal judicial materials: Litigants rarely-if ever-present them to
courts, and courts have rarely-if ever-considered them. There are a handful of possible
counterexamples, but none are squarely on point. The famous "Correspondence of the Justices,"
in which the Court wrote President Washington an official letter that refused Washington's
request for an advisory opinion, has been invoked as authority in several subsequent opinions
despite its extra-judicial character. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 354 (1911).
In Muskrat, the Court also relied upon a draft opinion prepared by Chief Justice Taney for Gordon
v. United States, 117 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). The draft had been written by Taney before his
death but was not published in the United States Reports until 1885. See 117 U.S. 697 (1885)
(printing the draft opinion and noting that "[i]t is the recollection of the surviving members of the
court, that this paper was carefully considered by the members of the court in reaching the
conclusion reported in 2 Wall. 561"). Finally, a court of appeals judge has discussed internal
judicial correspondence, but only because the court's internal procedure itself became legally
relevant in the unusual circumstances of the case. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045,
1067-68 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing internal
correspondence to demonstrate that court's procedures for en banc review had not malfunctioned),
rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
12. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
1314
Judicial History
draft and eventually retracted it in favor of a fact-specific opinion that was
published for the Court. Tushnet says that the Justices' consideration, and
arguable rejection of, the proposed distinction between white-collar and
blue-collar employees lacks any legal significance.13 But why? If a lower
court were subsequently tempted to interpret the published opinion as
implicitly resting on the rejected distinction, shouldn't the internal evidence
to the contrary be admissible? One obvious analogy is to the rejected-
proposal doctrine in statutory interpretation, under which courts sometimes
decline to interpret statutes in a manner identical to proposed bills
previously rejected by the legislature.14 The analogy does not hold in any
simple way; judicial opinions are not statutes, and judicial history is not
legislative history. Moreover, the rejected-proposal doctrine may well be
misguided for any number of formal and functional reasons. 5 But if the
doctrine applies in other interpretive settings it requires substantive
argument, rather than simple assertion, to show that it should not apply in
this setting as well.' 6
The law's distinctive treatment of judicial history is not a topic of
current debate. But we ought to be able to give reasons for this major
asymmetry in our interpretive practices. The untheorized exclusion of
judicial history deserves rational scrutiny, and this is so even if that
exclusion can indeed be justified on rational grounds. And the judicial
history puzzle may tell us something, perhaps a good deal, about the more
familiar debates over legislative history and similar materials. The
exclusion of judicial history is precisely the sort of unquestioned
assumption that defines the contours of our interpretive practices.
Accordingly, I shall both subject the exclusion of judicial history to critical
evaluation and use the judicial-history puzzle to illuminate persistent
debates over the use of official history in other interpretive domains.
My conclusions are as follows. First, I support the widespread
assumption that judicial history should not be used as an interpretive
source. But the arguments for that position are surprisingly complex. The
13. See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 473 n.1.
14. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) ("Few principles of
statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub
silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.")
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart,
J., dissenting)); Sinclair Ref. v. Atdnson, 370 U.S. 195, 209-10 (1962) (refusing to read a statute
to duplicate a proposal rejected by the conference committee).
15. See United States v. Estate of Romani, 118 S. Ct. 1478, 1488-89 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) (arguing that the rejected-proposal doctrine circumvents
constitutionally specified procedures for congressional lawmaking and imposes an onerous burden
of legislative history research).
16. The courts have indeed applied something like the rejected-proposal doctrine when
interpreting judicially-promulgated rules. See Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit, 684 F.2d 272, 275-77
(4th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (interpreting Rule 63 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
examining a transcript of a meeting of the judicially-appointed Advisory Committee that drafted
the rules; noting that at the relevant meeting the Committee considered, but rejected, a proposed
amendment to the rule).
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practice of exclusion cannot be derived from any clean formal rule or
neutral principle; there is only a cluster of structural and institutional
arguments to the effect that consulting judicial history would inflict
unacceptable harms upon the federal judiciary's decisiomaking processes.
Second, I touch upon a range of other official-history debates-principally
debates about the use of legislative history, presidential signing statements,
and the advisory committee notes to the federal rules of evidence and
procedure-and suggest that the judicial history puzzle can illuminate those
questions. For example, the exclusion of judicial history reveals grave
weaknesses in the most common arguments for judicial resort to legislative
history. Those arguments entail that judicial history should be an admissible
source as well, a consequence that would contradict settled interpretive
practices and commitments
Part II presents a straightforward argument for consulting judicial
history as an aid to the interpretation of judicially created texts. Section A
argues that under the interpretive criteria said to justify resort to other types
of official history, internal judicial materials might plausibly provide
helpful interpretive guidance when a judicial opinion or judicially
promulgated rule is ambiguous, opaque, or otherwise creates an interpretive
quandary. For example, judicial history could supply either revealing
evidence of the intentions of the judges who created the text or helpful
context for interpreting the text itself. Section B examines some current
judicial practices that support recourse to judicial history. Although courts
do not consult internal judicial history, they draw upon external judicial
materials such as litigants' briefs, oral argument transcripts, and the notes
of adjunct judicial committees. Those sources are declared relevant on
premises that would, if consistently applied, make judicial history
admissible either as evidence of judicial intention or as interpretive context.
Part Im considers a series of normative arguments that justify the
exclusion of judicial history. The justifications are drawn from the text of
Article III and its original understanding (Sections A and B) and from
considerations of the federal judiciary's institutional role in the
constitutional structure (Sections C and D). The structural and institutional
justifications prove the most persuasive. Resort to judicial history would
distort the Court's internal deliberations, render the history unreliable, and
undermine various rule of law norms associated with judicial
decisionmaking. To be sure, none of the structural arguments, taken by
itself, fully justifies the entrenched practice. Rather, that practice is best
understood to rest on a complex of rationales, with the practice mapping
imperfectly onto any one of those rationales. But it is no objection to a
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doctrine that it rests on several imperfect bases rather than on one dominant
theory.
17
Part IV draws upon the judicial history puzzle to illustrate some of the
conditions that plausible arguments about particular categories of official
history will satisfy, using the comparison between judicial and legislative
history as a running example. The considerations discussed in Parts II and
HI suggest that plausible arguments about official history will display two
features: localism and consistency. First, those arguments will derive not
from any global account of the role of official history as such, but from
more limited arguments (either formal or institutional) about particular
types of official history. Second, plausible positions in any local debate will
prove consistent in the minimal sense that the position, if transposed to
another debate and accepted there, will not contradict any view that the
proponent of the position holds in that other debate. In tandem, these
features point to an unexciting but manageable set of local agendas for
debates about official history. Arguments about particular categories of
official history would be tested against arguments from other contexts in a
long series of comparisons, thereby sifting out the plausible positions from
the implausible ones.
II. WHY NOT JUDICIAL HISTORY?
The argument for admitting judicial history as an interpretive source is
simple. Judicial bodies create a range of authoritative legal texts. These
texts-both judicial opinions and rules promulgated by the judiciary-often
require interpretation, for the same reasons that other sorts of legal texts
require interpretation. The phrasing of critical portions of the text may be
ambiguous or otherwise unclear; the text may have to be applied in legal
contexts remote from its creation, so that it does not speak directly to the
situation at hand; the passage of time may have made the sense of the
document obscure. Litigants, courts, and other interpreters thus dispute the
meaning of relevant judicially-created texts in a variety of legal settings.
Those interpreters craft their arguments by using many sorts of interpretive
techniques, such as careful attention to the language and structure of the
text, comparison to other texts relevant to the same subject matter, and
traditional maxims or canons of construction.
In some disputes, judicial history might prove a helpful supplement to
these interpretive tools. Detailed scholarly studies of judicial decisions in
17. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1642-45 (1987) (arguing that constitutional doctrines may derive from
multiple rationales).
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particular substantive areas have made this clear.18 In Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,19 for example, the Court held that state law,
rather than a uniform federal admiralty rule, would govern the effect of the
breach of certain warranties in a marine insurance policy? The decision
proved to be of the highest importance to the maritime law, but crucial
ambiguities in the opinion left the Court's ruling unclear. In a thorough
study of Wilburn Boat, Joel Goldstein draws upon the internal judicial
history of the case to support and to critique possible resolutions of the
ambiguities in the opinion." For example, Goldstein asks whether the Court
"intended state law to apply: (a) only to the warranties there at issue ... (b)
to breaches of any warranties in a marine insurance policy, or (c) to all
issues relating to marine insurance," 22 and whether "the Court thought the
McCarran Act" dictated its approachY3 Goldstein draws on both the
published opinion and internal judicial history to generate answers to both
24questions.
Goldstein's approach to Wilburn Boat, while novel, is hardly
ridiculous. Resort to judicial history as a legal source fits comfortably with
interpretive approaches and sources commonly seen elsewhere in federal
public law. Section A below describes two standard interpretive approaches
that could justify resort to internal judicial history. Section B describes
some external judicial materials that judges currently use to interpret
judicially promulgated texts, sources relevant only on premises that, if
consistently applied, would counsel the use of internal judicial history as
well.
18. Frederick Schauer anticipated the judicial history puzzle by addressing the question of
whether draft opinions supply any insights about the Supreme Court's rulemaking function. See
Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682 (1986) (reviewing BERNARD
ScHVARTz, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT (1985)). Schauer found that
"[t]he [Warren Court] drafts [published in Schwartz's book] do not turn substantially on disputes
about the specificity of the language to be used, on the kinds of examples, if any, to be included in
an opinion, or on whether the holding of the Court should be encapsulated in some rule-like test."
Id. at 686-87. None of this is necessarily inconsistent with the point that judicial history could in
some cases provide interpretive aid. It may be, as Schauer notes, that Schwartz's materials were
not sufficiently comprehensive for the purpose. See id. at 687. And the subsequently released
Marshall Papers provide a far richer store of judicial history than that to which Schwartz had
access.
19. 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
20. See id. at 320-21.
21. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part I), 28
J. MAR. L. & COM. 395 (1997) (drawing on the published opinion, internal conference notes, and
internal correspondence to interpret the opinion). It should be noted, though, that Goldstein is
ambivalent about his approach. See id. at 417 ("The Justices' papers, and the inferences and
speculations they support, are interesting and instructive in understanding how the Court operated
and decided the case. They should not, however, control judgments about Wilburn.... Ultimately,
the decision must stand or fall on its merits, on the reasons given for it or which might sustain
it.").
22. Id. at 435 (emphasis omitted).
23. Id. at 440.
24. See id. at 437 & n.228, 440. For another example of academic exploration of judicial
history, see Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping
and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 809-15
(1995).
1318 [Vol. 108: 1311
Judicial History
A. Judicial History as Evidence of Intent and as Interpretive Context
Two interpretive approaches often said to justify the admission of other
forms of official history could support recourse to internal judicial history
as well. First, judicial history could be said to provide evidence of the
intentions of the judges who wrote (or joined) a published judicial opinion
or who drafted a judicially promulgated rule. On this view, the proper way
to resolve an ambiguity in a judicially created text is to discover what those
who wrote the text intended to say. Second, internal judicial history could
be said to provide contextual guidance on the meaning of the judicially
created text. On this view, the intentions of the judges who created the text
are not controlling; the meaning of the text itself is the touchstone. But
internal judicial history could be used to illuminate that meaning.'
As detailed below, the arguments said to justify the application of
intentionalism and contextualism26 in statutory interpretation and other
domains also justify their application to judicially promulgated texts. That
is so whether the judicial text is a promulgated rule or an opinion;27 whether
any particular opinion represents an exercise of interpretation or of
common-lawmaking;s and whether the underlying theory of precedent
holds that a judicial opinion merely explains a judgment on particular facts,
or rather that the statement of a ratio decidendi in a judicial opinion itself
announces a binding rule of law.29 In any of these situations, later
interpreters will often desire to figure out how exactly the judicially
promulgated text should be read. Two familiar ways to answer that question
are to ask what the text's authors intended to say or, alternatively, how the
text itself should be read in light of the context of its creation.
25. Both of these approaches are interpretive, not predictive. They aim not to forecast the
likely behavior of the Court in a future case, but rather to understand the authoritative import of a
previous judicial decision. On a predictive theory of adjudication, in which judges properly seek
to avoid reversal by a higher court, the case for judicial resort to internal judicial materials would
be overwhelming. Those materials would supply excellent, perhaps incomparable, information on
which to base predictions about the Justices' future behavior. Cf. Michael C. Doff, Prediction and
the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651,693-94 (1995) (suggesting that in the context of Supreme
Court stay motions, where a single Circuit Justice must predict how the full Court would vote on a
certiorari petition, the Circuit Justice might legitimately consider "unpublished conference votes,
or unrecorded statements" of another Justice (footnote omitted)).
26. This pair of terms has been used in the legislative-history literature as well. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law, in
NOMOS XXXVI: THE RuLE OF LAW 265, 285 (1994).
27. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
29. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82,
103 n.29 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for
Judgments, 15 CARDozO L. REv. 43,43-79 (1993).
1999] 1319
The Yale Law Journal
1. Intentionalism
The intentionalist rationale for resort to internal judicial history seems
jarring upon a first encounter. Interpretive discourse often speaks of the
intentions of lawmakers, such as legislators, and justifies reference to
various forms of official history, such as legislative history, on the ground
that the official history supplies evidence of the lawmakers' intentions."
But one response is to say that such notions have no relevance to the
interpretation of judicially created texts. On this view, reference to the
intentions of the officials who created a legally authoritative text is coherent
(whether or not it is compulsory) only when the text represents an act of
discretionary lawmaking, rather than of interpretation.31 Intentionalism in
the interpretation of judicially promulgated texts does not comport with this
stricture, for most of those texts constitute interpretations of constitutional,
statutory, or regulatory provisions enacted elsewhere.
But this view rests upon several confusions. The Court itself sometimes
interprets judicial opinions and rulings, both its own and those of other
courts, by referring to the intentions of the judges who created them.32
Whether or not that is the correct criterion by which to interpret judicially
created texts, it is no more outlandish than the interpretation of statutes by
reference to the intentions of legislators. Federal judges engage in at least
some uncontroversial authorized rulemaking, and when they do so, an
interpretive strategy suitable to texts enacted by legislators should suit
judicially enacted rules as well. And intentionalism, as a general approach
to interpretive questions, could also be applied in the ordinary way to texts
(such as judicial opinions) that themselves constitute authorized acts of
interpretation, rather than of lawmaking.
30. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) ("In the
interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language
so as to give effect to the intent of Congress."); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 464 (1892) (consulting internal legislative history to "throw[] light upon the intent of
Congress").
31. This intuition probably has roots in some version of the declaratory theory of law,
associated with Blackstone, which embodies "the strongly held and deeply felt belief that judges
are bound by a body of fixed, overriding law, that they apply that law impersonally as well as
impartially, that they exercise no individual choice and have no program of their own to
advance." Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, the
Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62 (1965). These
jurisprudential waters are too deep to enter here. Suffice it to say that the use of judicial history as
an interpretive source is in principle compatible with the declaratory theory of law. Even if one
conceived of judges as the oracles of some preexisting body of law, one might turn to judicial
history for interpretive assistance when the precise content of their oracular declarations was
ambiguous or obscure. For discussion of the related argument that recourse to judicial history
would undermine judicial "legitimacy," see infra note 108.
32. See, e.g., Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 40 (1995) (inferring, from context and
language, that in disputed precedent "[w]e intended only to suggest" a certain proposition);
Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991) (vacating and remanding because "the record
before us does not clearly indicate what the District Court intended by its disposition"); Sisson v.
Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1990) (stating that if a previous opinion had "intended" to establish
a cerain principle, the Court would have said so more clearly).
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The Court sometimes acts as an authorized lawmaker, although within a
sharply limited domain. The Court, for example, holds delegated statutory
authority to promulgate the rules of federal civil, criminal, and appellate
procedure, and the federal rules of evidence.33 The statute that grants this
authority expressly provides that the judicially promulgated rules supersede
any inconsistent federal statutes. 4  In this domain, the intentionalist
argument that statutes may (or must) be interpreted with reference to the
intentions of their makers transposes comfortably to rules legislated by
judges. There is nothing internal to intentionalism that would prevent its
application to judicial officials with respect to areas in which judges are
authorized to enact binding rules in much the same way that legislators do.
Intentionalism might be applied in the same fashion to texts that
embody an act of interpretation rather than of lawmaking, such as a judicial
opinion construing some positive enactment.35 Constitutional and statutory
texts are often sufficiently general that judges must flesh them out by
articulating implementing doctrines. These doctrines are interpretive, in the
sense that their pedigree can be traced to an authoritative textual command,
yet often the Court possesses some discretion to decide what the precise
contours of the implementing doctrine will be?6 As Frederick Schauer has
noted, this condition often causes Supreme Court opinions to resemble
statutes; the opinion announces rules, or three-part tests, or some other
doctrinal structure resembling a codified legal text.37 If the opinion that
33. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994).
34. See id. § 2072(b) ("All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect after such rules have taken effect.").
35. In addition to conventional interpretation and ex ante rulemaking under the Rules
Enabling Act, the Court also engages in some amount of explicit lawmaking through case-by-case
adjudication. This "federal common law" is sometimes rooted in an express constitutional or
statutory delegation of lawmaking power, see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501 (authorizing federal courts
to develop evidentiary privileges "in the light of reason and experience"), but sometimes derives
simply from a loose reference to "issues of uniquely federal concern." Northwest Airlines v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981). See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1248-50 (1996)
(explaining the principal issues in the federal-common-law debate). The nature and legitimacy of
federal common law are hotly controverted, but nothing in the judicial-history problem turns on
these questions. To the extent that a lower court wished to understand a Supreme Court opinion,
for example, intentionalist and contextualist uses of judicial history would remain plausible
interpretive strategies whether that opinion was best classified as an example of interpretation or
rather of federal common-lawmaking. Under either classification, judicial history might assist
readers in understanding what exactly the opinion meant.
36. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 11 HARv. L. REV. 56, 56 (1997) ("Among the most important functions of the
Supreme Court are to craft and apply constitutional doctrine-a term that I use to embrace not
only the holdings of the cases, but also the analytical frameworks and tests that the Court's cases
establish." (footnote omitted)).
37. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1455 (1995) ("It is a
routine charge against contemporary judicial opinions that they read more like statutes than like
opinions of a court. According to the typical formulation of the charge, the modem judicial
opinion, especially the modem Supreme Court constitutional opinion, is excessively divided into
sections and subsections [and] relies too heavily on three-part tests .... "). The statute-like
character of the Court's opinions has probably become more pronounced of late, although there is
no way to measure the trend. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 177, 369 (1996) (describing "new emphasis on 'ruledness"' in federal adjudication,
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announces such an implementing doctrine displays crucial ambiguities, why
is it mistaken to ask what the judges who announced the doctrine intended
to say? The judges, after all, did attempt to communicate one formulation
rather than another; asking which formulation they intended seems no more
or less exceptionable than it does in other domains of legal interpretation.
Even outside the domains in which federal judges possess authorized
lawmaking authority, then, the intentions of the judges who create a judicial
opinion might be thought a permissible interpretive touchstone.
This application of intentionalism would be vulnerable to standard
criticisms of intentionalism generally-well-known puzzles about whose
intentions count, differences between motives, intentions, and purposes, and
so forth3 -but no more vulnerable than intentionalism is in any other
domain. And maybe less vulnerable. Some of those standard criticisms,
such as the claim that it is impossible to aggregate the understandings of
multiple relevant actors into a single intention,39 have less purchase in the
judicial context, where the background rules often make the intentions of a
single official determinative. An example is the rule that when no one
opinion commands the assent of a majority of the Court, the opinion of the
Justice who concurs in the judgment on the narrowest grounds supplies the
holding.'0 When judges and scholars pore over a concurrence in the
judgment by a single named Justice to interpret the Court's decision in a
particular case,41 the problem of collective intention loses most of its bite.42
exemplified by "the Supreme Court's emphatic modem efforts to lay down increasingly precise
rules of constitutional law" and noting "the increasing tendency of appellate courts, especially the
Supreme Court, to lay down rules rather than standards").
38. For a good overview of the conundrums of intentionalism, see ANDREI MARMOR,
INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 159-72 (1992).
39. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994) ("Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a
collective body.").
40. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). There are also more exotic situations in which the vote of one Justice
dictates the judgment, and that Justice's opinion therefore explains the holding of the case. For
example, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), in which eight Justices split four-to-four
on two issues, and Justice Black's opinion, joined by no other Justice, controlled both issues. See
generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993) (collecting and analyzing unusual voting situations).
41. A familiar example is Justice Powell's concurrence in Regents of the University of
Califomia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-324 (1978), upon which a mountain of analysis has slowly
risen. For debate over the significance of Powell's concurrence, compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996), which holds that the concurrence is not controlling, with Wessmann
v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798 (1st Cir. 1998), which holds that the concurrence is controlling.
42. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) 329, 331-32
(noting that "single-author" legislation avoids the most vexing problems of intentionalism). Even
in such contexts, however, it is still fruitful to study the problems of intentionalism that apply to
single minds. See MARMOR, supra note 38, at 159-65. And, of course, the problem of collective
intention retains its force in the many judicial settings where the background rules make collective
voting necessary for the issuance of an authoritative opinion. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982) (drawing upon voting theory to
argue that the Court is incapable of rendering consistent decisions over time).
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To be sure, the intentionalist justification encounters an interesting
objection that is itself intentionalist: The judicial history that currently
exists was not created with the intention or expectation that it would be
used as an interpretive source.43 On some versions of intentionalism,
interpreters are bound not only by the lawmakers' substantive intention to
enact rules with certain content, but also by their second-order intentions
about how the rules are to be interpreted.4 This view suggests that resort to
judicial history would violate interpreters' obligation to enforce the
interpretive intentions of the judges who created judicial history.
This point, while important, hardly constitutes a fatal objection to
resorting to judicial history on intentionalist premises. It is not clear that
there is a judicial interpretive intention about judicial history to be
respected; the judges who have created judicial history may simply have
not considered its possible use as an interpretive source. It requires an
argument to show that failure to consider the question should be treated as
equivalent to an affirmative intention that it not be so used. As in other
contexts, moreover, gauging interpretive intentions by reference to the
interpretive conventions in place at the time of lawmaking quickly
encounters problems of circularity and instability. If judicial history were
declared a valid interpretive source, future judges would (on the premises of
this account) expect that the judicial history they create would be used in
interpretation, and the argument from second-order expectations would
have defeated itself-at least prospectively-for judicial history created
after the declaration.
But the most difficult problem for the interpretive intentions argument
is that courts have ignored it in other domains. In its famous 1892 decision
in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,4 for example, the Court
overthrew the nineteenth-century rule barring recourse to legislative
history46 and drew upon a committee report to interpret a difficult statute in
light of congressional intention,' even though (on similar premises about
interpretive intentions) congressmen presumably prepared the legislative
history with the expectation that it would not become an interpretive
43. See Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of
the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1300 (1995) (rejecting possible
analogies between judicial history and the advisory committee notes that courts use to interpret
federal procedural rules on the ground that "while the Court's preliminary memos are never
intended for public consumption, the Advisory Committee Notes are expressly intended for that
purpose").
44. For a complex analysis of legislation and interpretive expectations, see Joseph Raz,
Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POsrrITsM 249
(Robert P. George ed., 1996).
45. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
46. See, e.g., Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 23-24 (1845) (declaring internal
legislative history inadmissible).
47. See Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464-65.
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source.41 Indeed, this sort of retroactive change in official-history rules
might prove all the more tempting insofar as the official history generated
before the change would, all else equal, possess greater reliability than
history generated after the change, assuming that judicial use of the history
increases the incentives of its creators to manipulate the record.49 In sum,
without some broader account of when the interpretive expectations of
officials should be honored, interpreters could with some justice decide to
apply the Holy Trinity model to judicial history.
2. Contextualism
Intentionalism is not the only interpretive criterion on which resort to
judicial history could be grounded. For a range of reasons, it might well be
thought that the intentions of the judges who created a text cannot trump the
text itself; textual meaning, rather than authorial intention, is the controlling
interpretive criterion. But such a position does not necessarily bar reference
to materials beyond the authoritative text itself. The interpreter might take
the position that the meaning of a legal text must be understood with
reference to the context of its creation and that the official history of the
text's creation supplies just this sort of illuminating context. Judicial history
would then be used not to prove an authoritative judicial intention existing
apart from the opinion or rule under dispute, but rather to gain persuasive
insight into textual meaning by reviewing the setting in which the opinion
or rule was created, the problems it addressed, and the linguistic and
cultural presuppositions inherent in its language.
Here, too, the legislative history debate supplies helpful analogies. In
the 1930s, defenders of legislative history responded to realist attacks on
legislative intent with "a plea of confession and avoidance: Legislative
history itself is not law, but law's meaning depends on context, and
legislative history is the most authoritative context for determining the
probable meaning of the statutory language." 50 Justice Holmes had earlier
adopted a similar position, saying both that the object of judicial inquiry is
"what the statute means" rather than "what the legislators meant," 51 and
also that recourse to legislative history was permissible to illuminate
48. See Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertemporal Law of Statutory
Construction and Constitutional Interpretation, 43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 319, 321-22 (1995) (noting
that Holy Trinity applied a new interpretive rule retroactively despite a direct conflict with clear
statutory language).
49. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1320-21 (1998) (arguing that
originalist materials are more reliable than legislative history, because the former were prepared
without the expectation that judges would systematically use them as an interpretive source).
50. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 211 (1994).
51. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417,
414-19 (1899).
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statutory meaning. More recently, this position has become something like
the consensus justification for judicial resort to legislative history. 3 The
contextualist position also transposes comfortably to the problem of judicial
history. The plausible point that the interpretation of judicially-created texts
should seek to ascertain the meaning of the text, rather than judicial
intention, is compatible with recourse to context to determine textual
meaning; and judicial history might be an important element of that context.
The contextualist approach applies with equal force to judicially-
promulgated rules and to judicial opinions. When applied to rules
promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act,5 contextualism makes no more
or less sense than it does when applied to statutes; there is nothing internal
to contextualism to suggest that rules legislated by judges should be treated
differently than rules legislated by elected officials. The contextualist
approach would apply in the same way to the interpretation of judicial
opinions. Judicial history would supply background against which the
authoritative language of the opinion could be better understood.
The contextualist argument for resort to judicial history cannot show
that its use is always helpful or ever necessary. Perhaps the lengthy and
discursive opinions that judges issue, complete with detailed statements of
fact and reasoning, supply enough context to interpret the operative legal
rulings in the opinion itself in most cases. On this view, analogies between
judicial history and legislative history are misdirected; rather, the judicial
opinion itself supplies the context that, in statutory interpretation, courts
obtain from the reports of congressional committees."
52. See, e.g., Boston Sand & Gravel v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J.)
("It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in order to
raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude
consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."). Justice Thomas appears to be edging towards a
similar position. Although he adheres to the principle that the object of statutory interpretation is
to ascertain textual meaning, rather than legislative intent, he has recently begun to rely upon
legislative history to illuminate the textual meaning. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust, 118 S. Ct. 927, 935 & n.6 (1998) (Thomas, J.) (relying upon both the
statute's "express terms" and legislative history).
53. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 62-64 (1997) (surveying the
broad support for a "contextualist" defense of legislative history); Stephen G. Breyer, On the
Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 863 (1992) ("No one
claims that legislative history is a statute, or even that, in any strong sense, it is 'law.' Rather,
legislative history is helpful in trying to understand the meaning of the words that do make up the
statute or the 'law."'); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 285 (" [S]tatements in [legislative
history) may provide evidence as to common understandings of people interacting in the area in
question. Such statements ... may be employed by courts to resolve ambiguities in the statute.
Such ajustification might be termed 'contextualist."').
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994).
55. See Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1, 26 (1988) ("Committee reports are in many
ways analogous to majority opinions in case law."). It is tempting to buttress this claim by
pointing to an important procedural difference between statutes and judicial opinions: Any judge
may express his views on the official record in the public reports, while a legislator may only
place his views into the official record by gamering a majority coalition of his colleagues to vote
those views into law. But the distinction does not work. An appellate judge, like a legislator, may
express his views with binding legal effect only if he obtains agreement on those views from a
majority of the relevant decisionmaking body, in his case the court. Any judge may speak at will
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But why do these points, even if plausible, justify excluding judicial
history altogether? If judicial history sometimes provides helpful context,
then judges should, on contextualist premises, consult it and accord it the
weight that it deserves in the circumstances.56 Even if a judicial opinion
relates to the holding of the case in the same way that a committee report
relates to a statute, courts might consult judicial history for the same
additional assistance that they seek in broader sources of legislative history,
such as floor debate, rejected bills, and the like.57 Furthermore, resort to
judicial history will less often prove affirmatively harmful than resort to
legislative history. Judges who are unfamiliar with the legislative process
and with the voluminous and unusual materials often found in legislative
history will frequently err in their use of those sources.58 Judges consulting
judicial history, by contrast, will generally understand the provenance and
significance of the documents and will possess the trained competence
needed to give those documents the proper degree of interpretive weight.
Resort to judicial history might also be thought unnecessary when the
Supreme Court interprets its own precedents. Those precedents do not bind
the Court in later cases, at least not in the strong sense in which statutes
(where constitutional) bind the Court. A constitutionally valid statute is a
hierarchically superior source of law that the Court must construe and obey.
When the meaning of a prior Court precedent is subject to interpretive
dispute in a case before the Court, however, the obligation of interpretive
fidelity is weaker. In that situation, the institution that created the text is the
same institution that interprets the text, and there is no hierarchical
obligation of fidelity; there is only the relatively weak and prudential
obligation of stare decisis. In hard cases, accordingly, the Court may simply
decide that a precedent is unclear and decide the issue afresh (although that
fresh decision may itself require the interpretation of a hierarchically
superior source).
For these reasons, the Court could decide that recourse to judicial
history as interpretive context is unnecessary. If standard techniques for the
interpretation of judicial opinions do not disclose the precedent's meaning,
the current Court has the power to decide the issue anew, rather than asking
what some of the Court's members previously said about the issue in
judicial history-an especially sensible procedure if the Justices who wrote
by means of a concurring or dissenting opinion, but then again any legislator may speak at will by
inserting a statement into legislative history.
56. Cf. Breyer, supra note 53, at 862 ("If the [legislative] history is vague, or seriously
conflicting, do not use it. No one claims that history is always useful; only that it sometimes
helps." (internal quotation omitted)).
57. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Acme Fast Freight, 336 U.S. 465,
472-75 (1949) (preferring the uncontradicted statement of the ranking minority member to
conflicting explanations in a committee report); FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (dismissing as "uninformed ipse dixit" statements in the House report that sponsors
contradicted in the House and Senate debates).
58. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1863-77.
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the precedent and its internal history are still on the Court at the time of
interpretation.
The point, however, holds only within a limited domain. For lower
federal courts, for example, a Supreme Court precedent is a binding,
hierarchically superior source of law,59 and the option of declaring the
precedent unclear and deciding the issue anew may not obtain. It is hard to
see any clean conceptual difference between a lower court's use of judicial
history to interpret a controlling Supreme Court precedent and a lower
court's decision to consult legislative history to interpret a controlling
statute.6" Even with respect to the Supreme Court, the point does not hold
for judicially created texts that assume the force of statutes upon
promulgation, such as the rules of procedure that the Court promulgates
with congressional assent; those rules do bind the Court, at least in
principle.6"
Apart from its restricted scope, the argument that resort to judicial
history may be unnecessary when the Court interprets its own precedents
does not by itself entail a flat rule excluding internal judicial history as an
interpretive source. That the Court need not consult judicial history is quite
compatible with the argument that it can, and should, when that history
proves helpful. There is a valid core to the necessity argument; if, as argued
below, the institutional harms of recourse to judicial history are great, the
lack of any necessity to use it provides scope for a cost-benefit calculus that
excludes judicial history even if it is indeed helpful in some contexts. But
that is a separate question, and the necessity argument cannot carry the
point of its own force.
59. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997) (stating that lower courts are bound
by directly controlling Supreme Court precedent); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (same); see also POSNER, supra note 37, at 367 ("Supreme Court
decisions bind the courts of appeals in a way in which they do not bind the Court itself .. ");
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817 (1994) (describing and justifying lower courts' obligation to obey a superior court's
precedents). Most interpretation of Supreme Court precedents occurs in the lower courts rather
than in the Court itself, because lower court opinions far outnumber the opinions of the Supreme
Court. In 1995, for example, the federal courts of appeals published 5360 opinions. See William
M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27
J. LEGAL STuD. 271, 283 n.30 (1998). In the same year, the Supreme Court issued 75 signed
opinions out of 90 cases argued. See William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary 5-6 (visited Dec. 21, 1998) <http://www.uscourts.gov/cj97.htm>.
60. Cf. Klaidman, supra note 4, at 12 ("Many lawyers say they would never cite the papers
explicitly in a Supreme Court brief or oral argument, lest they incur the wrath of Justices who are
angry about the papers' release. But the advisability of using the documents in the lower courts
remains an open, intriguing question.").
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994) ("All laws in conflict with such rules [promulgated by
the Court] shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 (1989) (" [Tihe rules of procedure bind judges and courts in the
proper management of the cases before them .... ).
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B. External Judicial Materials
Surprisingly, current judicial practice provides indirect support for the
intentionalist and contextualist arguments for resort to judicial history.
Although the Court itself has (almost) never drawn upon internal judicial
history,62 it sometimes draws upon external judicial materials generated by
litigants, judicial adjuncts, and other actors during the process of
adjudication or judicial rulemaking. The premises that make these external
materials relevant and admissible go far toward making internal judicial
history relevant and admissible as well.
The Court occasionally interprets its own opinions, and the rules it
adopts, by reference to the briefs (including certiorari petitions), questions
and answers during oral argument, the official notes of advisory committees
created during the judicial rulemaking process, and other materials
generated in the course of judicial business before the issuance of an
authoritative final text.63 The Court's theory for resorting to these materials
has sometimes been intentionalist, and sometimes contextualist; it describes
the materials as evidence of intent or as helpful context for ascertaining the
meaning of a judicially promulgated rule. If these materials, generated by
judicial processes during the course of creation of a judicial text, are
admissible, internal judicial history should be admissible as well. After all,
internal judicial history is proximate to the promulgation of the
authoritative text and is created by the judges themselves; it is thus
plausibly a better source of guidance, on either the intentionalist or the
contextualist criterion, than more remote materials generated by parties,
judicial-branch committees, and the like.
The Court's resort to judicial materials to interpret judicially-created
texts is most familiar from the judicial rule-making process. Under the
Rules Enabling Act,64 the Court possesses statutory authority to promulgate
rules of procedure and evidence. 65 The Judicial Conference prepares the
preliminary drafts of the ruies, with the assistance of adjunct advisory
committees composed of academics, practitioners and judges; the
committees prepare official notes to the drafts.66 The drafts are forwarded to
the Court, which modifies them as it pleases and then promulgates them.
62. See supra note 11.
63. See infra notes 64-80 and accompanying text. The Court has consulted similar
materials-such as pleadings, motions, and trial court rulings-in order to determine whether an
opaque state court opinion should be deemed to rest upon an independent and adequate state
ground. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COuRT PRACTICE 144 (7th ed. 1993) (citing
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 318 (1958); First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341,
346 (1926)).
64. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (1994).
65. See id. § 2072(a)
66. See id. § 2073(a)(2); Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking




Unless Congress vetoes the promulgated rules within a fixed deadline (and
it rarely does), the rules take effect as law.67 The Court, then, has an official
legislative role as far as these rules are concerned, although in practice the
Court often approves the proposals of the advisory committees.
When the rules become subject to interpretive controversy, the Court
frequently draws upon the advisory committee notes as both persuasive
scholarly commentary and an authoritative interpretive source. The Court
cites the advisory committee notes to the federal rules sometimes as
evidence of the intent or purpose underlying a rule-referring to the intent
of the advisory committee members who initially drafted the rule-and
sometimes as general background material, in a manner best understood as
a contextualist attempt to read the promulgated text in light of the
circumstances of its drafting.6" Either use might be said to support recourse
to judicial history. If materials generated by advisory officials within the
judicial branch during the creation of an authoritative text provide indirect
evidence of the intentions underlying a rule the Justices promulgate, or
indirect interpretive context for construing the rules, then internal history
should be admissible as well.
A recent controversy over the Court's use of the advisory committee
notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence illustrates the point.69 In Tome v.
United States,7" Justice Kennedy's plurality relied upon the advisory
committee notes as both authoritative evidence of the purpose or intent of
the rules' drafters7 and as "a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of
the Rules." 7 Justice Scalia's concurrence asked the right question about
this use of the rules:
[The Notes] bear no special authoritativeness as the work of the
draftsmen .... It is the words of the Rules that have been
authoritatively adopted-by this Court, or by Congress if it makes a
statutory change. In my view even the adopting Justices' thoughts,
unpromulgated as Rules, have no authoritative (as opposed to
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994); Cheryl L. Haas, Note, Judicial Rulemaking: Criticisms
and Cures for a System in Crisis, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 136-37 (1995).
68. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; see also Laurens Walker, Writings on the
Margin of American Law: Committee Notes, Comments and Commentary, 29 GA. L. REV. 993,
997-1007 (1995) (surveying the judicial use of advisory committee notes).
69. The situation is slightly more complicated with respect to the current Federal Rules of
Evidence in particular. Although the statutory rulemaking process is identical for procedural rules
and evidence rules, Congress by special statute modified and affirmatively enacted the Court's
promulgated version of the evidence rules, rather than permitting them to take effect by default;
and Congress had the Advisory Committee Notes before it. The Advisory Committee Notes to the
evidence rules, then, might be conceived as ordinary legislative history. Nothing in the following
discussion, however, is affected by this complication.
70. 513 U.S. 150 (1995).
71. See, e.g., id. at 163 ("Nothing in the Advisory Committee's Notes suggests that it
intended to alter the common-law premotive requirement."); id. at 160 ("The Notes disclose a
purpose to adhere to the common law in the application of evidentiary principles ... .
72. Id. at 160.
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persuasive) effect, any more than their thoughts regarding an
opinion (reflected in exchanges of memoranda before the opinion
issues) authoritatively demonstrate the meaning of that opinion....
Like a judicial opinion and like a statute, the promulgated Rule says
what it says, regardless of the intent of its drafters.73
Justice Scalia's point in this passage sounds in consistency. If the
advisory committee notes provide intentionalist or contextualist evidence
about a rule promulgated by the Court, why should not internal judicial
history--" exchanges of memoranda" and the like--do the same?74 The
Court's practice of consulting materials generated within the judicial
branch, such as the advisory committee notes, to interpret judicially
promulgated texts must rest on premises that support the use of internal
judicial history.
Where judicial opinions are concerned, the Court also has occasionally
resorted to background materials generated during the adjudicative process
as evidence of judicial intent or as interpretive context. Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co.75 required the Court to interpret its own ambiguous opinion in
the previous case of Parker v. Brown.76 Parker had held either (depending
on one's reading) that the Sherman Act did not apply to the actions of state
officials, or that the Sherman Act did not apply to any form of state action
in a broader sense, including private action required by state law." The
plurality opinion in Cantor announced that "[t]he way the Sherman Act
question was presented and argued in that case sheds significant light on the
character of the state-action concept embraced by the Parker holding" " and
thus proceeded to scrutinize the briefs and oral arguments of the litigants in
Parker, against the background of the question presented for certiorari. As
the parties, according to the Cantor plurality, had focused solely on the
question of action by state officials themselves, this context supported the
plurality's narrow interpretation of the opinion.7 9
Justice Stewart's dissent in Cantor sharply criticized the plurality's
interpretive methodology-but on grounds that make the exclusion of
judicial history seem arbitrary in a regime that does consider other forms of
adjudicative context. Stewart wrote:
I would have thought that except in rare instances an analysis of the
positions taken by the parties in briefs submitted to this Court
73. Id. at 167-68 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (citation omitted).
74. For discussion of the argument that the advisory committee notes, unlike internal
memoranda, were created for public consumption, see supra notes 43-49.
75. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
76. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
77. See id. at 350-52.
78. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 585.
79. See id. at 587-92.
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should play no role in interpreting its written opinions. A contrary
rule would permit the "plain meaning" of our decisions to be
qualified or even overridden by their "legislative history"-i.e.,
briefs submitted by the contending parties. The legislative history
of congressional enactments is useful in discerning legislative
intent, because that history emanates from the same source as the
legislation itself and is thus directly probative of the intent of the
draftsmen. The conflicting views presented in the adversary briefs
and arguments submitted to this Court do not bear an analogous
relationship to the Court's final product."0
Justice Stewart's reason for rejecting the interpretive value of litigant
arguments cuts in favor of recourse to internal judicial history. Just as
proponents of legislative history describe it as an especially helpful
interpretive source because it is generated within the legislature itself,"1 so
too a proponent of recourse to internal judicial history might argue that a
court willing to examine litigant arguments and oral argument transcripts
should admit internal judicial history a fortiori, for that history supplies
context that is proximate to the final text and is generated wholly within the
institution that creates the text. An analogous point was made by critics of
the nineteenth-century non-recourse rule of statutory interpretation, which
permitted recourse to the "public history of the times" surrounding an
enactment to shed light on legislative intent, but barred recourse to internal
legislative history documents.8 2 Attorney General Caleb Cushing, for
example, suggested that this combination was internally inconsistent; if the
public history of the times was admissible, "how can it be that we are shut
out from that field of inquiry [i.e., internal legislative history], which may
be the most suggestive of trains of thought or of facts resulting in the
discovery of the truth?" 3
The argument for admitting judicial history as an interpretive source
(rather than as a historical or predictive source) is quite simple. In other
fields of legal interpretation, courts consult official history material on both
intentionalist and contextualist grounds. That material is thought to provide
authoritative evidence of the intentions of the document's drafters or
80. Il at 617-18 (Stewart, I., dissenting) (emphasis added and citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 50, at 231 ("[Tnhere may be good reasons to prefer the
fictions surrounding legislative history to those of the new textualism. At least legislative history
is created within the legislative process and is subject to legislative reaction and correction.");
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 46 (1994) (arguing that unlike nonstatutory
interpretive sources, "explanations offered in committee reports or in bill managers' statements at
least derive from Congress's own policymaking authority").
82. See Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845) ("The law as it passed is the will
of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is the act itself; and
we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity
exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the
times in which it was passed.").
83. City of Georgetown, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 546,560 (1856).
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helpful context in which to situate the document's meaning. It is not a
necessary condition for the validity of either approach that the document
under interpretation itself be an act of lawmaking, such as a statute. When,
for example, judges must interpret an ambiguous judicial opinion that itself
construed some primary legal document, it is perfectly coherent (whether or
not justified) to ask what the judges who wrote the opinion intended it to
mean, and it is also coherent to consult the internal history of the opinion to
situate it in context. There is nothing special about judicial history.
Arguments from other interpretive settings that support the use of internal
materials apply to the judiciary as well.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUSION
This straightforward argument for consulting judicial history, however,
only skims the surface of the problem. In particular, the point that recourse
to judicial history fits comfortably with several commonly invoked
interpretive approaches is the beginning, not the end, of analysis. It must
also be asked whether an interpretive regime that admits judicial history
coheres with the text, history, and structure of the Constitution and
produces acceptable institutional consequences for the federal judiciary.
This Part considers a range of normative arguments' that justify the
practice of excluding judicial history, justifications drawn from the text of
Article ll, the original understanding of the federal judicial power, and
considerations of the judiciary's institutional role within the constitutional
structure.s5 The structural and institutional considerations prove the most
84. These arguments are therefore not intended to explain the historical origins of the current
exclusion of judicial history. Such an explanation would require a complex analysis of
institutional and jurisprudential developments in American law that would exceed the scope of the
present work.
85. Another attempted justification might state the following general principle: Official
history may be used as an interpretive source only if the institution or official who generated the
history placed it on the public record. On this view, legislative history would be admissible
because it is published in the Congressional Record. Some other types of official history would be
admissible as well (although perhaps not the notes of the constitutional convention, which
Madison suppressed until his death, see James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The
Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tax. L. REV. 1, 24 (1986)). Judicial history, on the other
hand, would not be admissible unless judges chose to publish it in the law reports.
It is arguable that even by this "public record" test, judicial history should be admissible. It
might be said that many Justices have placed their working papers on the public record. See supra
note 2 (describing collections of Justices' papers at the Library of Congress and elsewhere). Why
do the U.S. Reports count as the public record but the Library of Congress does not? Both are
funded by the government. In addition, the judicial working papers themselves were generated by
government officials in the course of their official duties. Granted, judicial working papers are not
opened to the public contemporaneously with the opinion, but that is true of so-called
"subsequent legislative history" as well. And some judicial history cannot be placed on the public
record under any definition. A draft opinion, for example, is replaced by the official opinion in the
reports in the same way that a draft bill is replaced by the enacted statute; it would be as unusual
to publish a draft opinion in the U.S. Reports as it would be to publish a draft bill in the Statutes at
Large.
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persuasive. Although neither the text of the Constitution nor the Framers'
conception of judicial decisionmaking supplies a clean prohibition of
judicial history, 6 there is good reason to fear that its admission would
inflict institutional harms that would undermine the judiciary's assigned
role in the constitutional structure. Taken together, these structural and
institutional concerns justify the exclusion of judicial history.
A. The Text of Article III
In many domains in which official history is potentially useful,
opponents of its use point to rules explicit or implicit in constitutional text
and structure that are said to require exclusion of that history. The two most
obvious examples are the enduring debate over legislative history and the
recent debate over presidential signing statements. In the legislative history
debate, textualist opponents of legislative history contend that the text and
structure of the Constitution, particularly the requirements of bicameralism
and presentment for the enactment of federal legislation that are detailed in
Article I, Section 7, entail that only statutory text is law. 7 On that premise,
the judicial practice of affording authoritative weight to legislative history
violates an implicit constitutional prohibition because it treats that history
as law."8 A different version of the textualist argument suggests that judicial
use of legislative history as an authoritative source in effect allows
Congress to delegate law-interpreting power to congressional subgroups
But the public-record test itself is flawed. If it assumes that a judge's failure to put judicial
history on the record reflects an intention that the history not be used as an interpretive source,
then it overlooks that legislators and executive officials place material on the public record partly
out of constitutional or statutory compulsion. See infra Section ll.C (discussing the Journal
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3, and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-557
(1994)). In any event it assumes--controversially-that an official's intentions about
interpretation bind later interpreters. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (questioning
this assumption). If that is not the point, then the public-record test just reasserts the current state
of legal practice by definitional flat: Judicial history is not part of the public record because it is
not an admissible source. But presumably, if everyone thought judicial history an admissible
source, it would constitute part of the public record and might be published in the same way
legislative history is. The question is whether that state of affairs would prove beneficial, and
definitions of the public record provide no guidance on that question.
86. Nor do statutory sources supply a clean prohibition of judicial history. Just as there is no
general federal statute that regulates judicial resort to legislative history, there is no statute that
addresses legal (or for that matter nonlegal) uses of judicial history.
87. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3 (specifying that a "Bill" may become a "Law" only
by approval by both Houses of Congress and presentment to the President, followed by either
presidential signature or a presidential veto and repassage by two-thirds majorities in both
Houses).
88. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that legislative history is a "frail substitute[ for [a] bicameral vote upon the text of a law
and its presentment to the President" (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983))).
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and agents, in violation of structural constraints on legislative self-
delegation. 9
Proponents of legislative history, by contrast, argue that the
Constitution places few constraints on judicial use of legislative history.
The constitutional requirements for the enactment of legislation, they claim,
do not speak to judicial interpretation of legislation. As David Strauss puts
it, "Article I, section 7 does not say anything explicit about what to do
when a controversy arises about what a duly-enacted federal statute requires
or permits."" Moreover, judicial resort to legislative history does not
elevate legislative history to the status of "law" in any important sense. On
this view, judges may consult legislative history simply to illuminate the
meaning of authoritative statutory text when that meaning is ambiguous or
otherwise unclear.9
The debate over presidential signing statements is in part conducted on
constitutional grounds as well. Proponents of judicial resort to presidential
signing statements argue that the President's powers under Articles I and II
to veto bills92 and to propose legislation93 make him a participant in the
legislative process and thus make signing statements part of the
"legislative" history of the bill.94 Opponents of resort to signing statements
emphasize that Article I vests all federal legislative power in the Congress,
and that the President's defined constitutional powers to participate in the
legislative process should not be read to imply any broader role.95 Judicial
use of presidential signing statements as evidence of legislative intent, the
argument runs, allows the President to modify or nullify the congressional
intent underlying specific provisions in a manner that resembles the
constitutionally prohibited line-item veto.96
89. See Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust, 116 S. Ct. 637, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment). See generally John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) (providing a thorough exposition of the
nondelegation argument for textualism).
90. David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1565, 1573 (1997).
91. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 53, at 863 ("A judge cannot interpret the words of an
ambiguous statute without looking beyond its words for the words have simply ceased to provide
univocal guidance to decide the case at hand.").
92. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, par. 2, cl. 1.
93. See id. at art. II, § 3.
94. See Walter DeUinger, Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum Counsel to the President,
48 ARK. L. REV. 333, 339 (1995) ("In support of the view that signing statements can be used to
create a species of legislative history, it can be argued that the President as a matter both of
constitutional right and of political reality plays a critical role in the legislative process.").
95. See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66
IND. L.J. 699, 709 (1991) ("The President... is not a legislator and therefore cannot create
authoritative legislative history."); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 587 (1952) ("The Constitution limits [the President's] functions in the lawmaking process to
the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.").
96. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998) (holding that the exercise of
presidential cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act violates the requirements
for lawmaking set forth in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7); Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer,
Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive
Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 376 (1987) (" [B]y reinterpreting those
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By analogy, one type of justification for the exclusion of judicial
history could point to some specific constitutional rule forbidding resort to
judicial history as an interpretive source. If, for example, Article Il were
thought to mandate that federal courts could exercise the judicial power
only through the issuance of judgments accompanied by formal written
opinions, arguments akin to those in the legislative-history debate would
arise: Opponents of judicial history could argue that resort to material
outside the corpus of formal opinions would circumvent the constitutional
rule by according authoritative effect to a source not specified as
authoritative by the rule itself.
It turns out, though, to be surprisingly difficult to generate persuasive
arguments for such a constitutional prohibition; the comparison to the
debates over legislative history and presidential signing statements merely
emphasizes the puzzle of judicial history. In the legislative-history debate,
for example, the textualist argument from Article I infers a prohibition on
judicial resort to legislative history from the specification of procedures for
the enactment of federal legislation. But the text of Article I is far less
detailed than that of Article I and thus provides fewer resources from which
to deduce a constitutionally-mandated rule that would exclude judicial
history as an interpretive source.
Article I specifies both the substantive reach of federal legislative
power and the procedures by which Congress and the President may jointly
exercise that power.97 Article II, by contrast, specifies categories of
"cases" and "controversies" to which the federal judicial power extends,"
but says nothing about the procedures by which courts vested with the
judicial power must or may consider and decide cases and announce their
decisions.99 In particular, there is no explicit requirement in Article I that
federal courts must decide cases by written opinion-let alone that internal
judicial history is an impermissible source of interpretive guidance on any
opinions that are issued.
The same point holds for the debate over the use of presidential signing
statements. Articles I and II provide material from which to argue that
courts ought not to consult such statements as aids to the interpretation of
statutes. Although the relevant constitutional texts also provide resources
for the contrary argument, there is at least some basis for discussion. By
parts of congressionally enacted legislation of which he disapproves, the President exercises
unconstitutional line-item veto power.").
97. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (specifying procedures for the enactment of valid federal
statutes); id. at. art. I, § 8 (enumerating substantive grants of federal legislative power).
98. Id. at art. III,§ 2.
99. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF PoLmCs 5 (2d ed. 1986) (" [Article IH] does not purport to tell the Court how to
decide cases; it only specifies which kinds of case the Court shall have jurisdiction to deal with at
all. Thus, in giving jurisdiction in [particular categories of] cases .... the clause is not read as
prescribing the process of decision to be followed.").
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contrast, there is no hook in the text of Article m on which a rule excluding
judicial history might be hung.l"°
B. Original Understanding
Article II's silence about the procedures for judicial decisionmaking
and the admissibility of judicial history merely prevents the grounding of an
exclusionary rule in explicit constitutional text. It does not entail that
judicial history must be admissible, for there is no general background rule
that permits the consideration of anything the Constitution fails to proscribe
explicitly. An independent basis for exclusion could be found in some
implicit background rule that makes resort to judicial history illegitimate.
The obvious source of such a rule would be the original understanding of
Article II's grant of the "judicial Power." ' If the framers' conception of
judicial decisionmaking required courts to decide cases by official
publication of their decisions, the use of internal judicial history to interpret
those decisions (whether the interpreter is a judge or a nonjudicial official)
might be thought to circumvent that requirement.
The originalist argument for a background rule excluding judicial
history, however, proves surprisingly difficult to sustain. Early judicial
practice does not conform to the present model, in which judges often
(although with diminishing frequency)1 2 decide cases through full-dress
published, discursive opinions that are reprinted in a national reporter
system. Rather, state courts at the time of the framing and the federal courts
in the early years of the republic often followed the traditional practice of
English courts by delivering oral opinions or unexplained orders. Court
reporters, attorneys, and other interested parties were forced to reconstruct
the decisions from the judges' private notes, the recollections of spectators,
and other materials not resembling any authoritative text.
In Virginia during the late eighteenth century, for example, one
historian recounts:
[T]he judges each gave their individual opinions orally seriatim.
These opinions were then noted down by anyone in the courtroom
who cared to do so. Sometimes the judges had written notes from
which to deliver their opinions; sometimes not. When the judges
100. Cf id. at 1 ("Congress was created very nearly full blown by the Constitution itself. The
vast possibilities of the presidency were relatively easy to perceive and soon, inevitably,
materialized. But the institution of the judiciary needed to be summoned up out of the
constitutional vapors .... ).
101. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 (vesting the "judicial Power of the United States" in
particular federal courts and enumerating categories of "Cases" and "Controversies" to which
that power shall extend).
102. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 162-63
(1996) (describing an increase in the number of unpublished opinions and judgment orders in the
federal system).
1336 [Vol. 108: 1311
Judicial History
wrote out their opinions, they might gave[sic] them to the reporter
of decisions after they had been read in court.... It was not until
1820, however, that the Court of Appeals of Virginia was provided
with an official salaried reporter of decisions. 3
The reporter sometimes prepared published opinions from the rough
notes of the judges themselves: Bushrod Washington, later a Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court, prepared some reports of Virginia cases from notes
given to him by Justice Edmund Pendleton."
Throughout the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth
centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court followed similar loosely structured
procedures for announcing its decisions. "Until the early 1800s it was
apparently the practice of the Court not to reduce its opinions to writing....
As late as 1834 the Court had no requirement that its opinions be filed with
the Clerk." 5 After announcing their opinions in the courtroom, the Justices
of the Marshall Court might give any manuscript or notes they had
developed to the reporter, whose duty was, as Justice Story described it, to
"abridge arguments, to state facts, [and] to give the opinions of the Court
substantially as they [were] delivered." 106 Story's description suggests the
loose and discretionary character of the process by which the Justices
transmitted their decisions to the public. When Henry Wheaton took up the
office of reporter in 1816, for instance, "the Justices, for their part, agreed
to furnish him any written opinions they might prepare, or notes they might
make in connection with their oral opinions." " Such notes, approximating
draft manuscripts or internal memoranda, would today count as
inadmissible judicial history.
This picture of judicial decisionmaking at the time of the framing, far
from providing an originalist argument against judicial history, sharpens the
point that Article I contains insufficient resources for a formal argument
against the use of judicial history as an interpretive source. The comparison
with the original understanding of Article I is illuminating. It is impossible
103. W.H. Bryson, Virginia Law Reports and Records, 1776-1800, in 1 ESSAYS, CASE LAW
IN THE MAKING: THE TECHNIQUES AND METHODS OF JUDICIAL REcoRDs AND LAW REPORTS 99,
101 (Alain Wijffels ed., 1997).
104. See id. at 101. These practices had deep roots in colonial-era traditions surrounding the
creation and dissemination of judicial records. Colonial judges took notes of the cases before
them, and the resulting "bench books" became part of the record of the relevant courts. See Erwin
C. Surrency, Law Reports in the United States, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 48, 52 (1981). Lawyers
also developed judicial records; their notes of arguments and decisions were referenced by other
lawyers and sometimes became the basis for printed volumes of reports. See id. at 50-51.
105. 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-35, at 385 n.3 (1988) (citation omitted);
see also Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on
Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (noting that as of 1806 "the Court
apparently failed, even in its most important cases, to reduce its opinions to writing" (footnote
omitted)).
106. WHITE, supra note 105, at 183 (quoting letter from Joseph Story to Richard Peters, esq.,
May 7, 1836, in 2 WILLiAM W. STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 231 (1851)).
107. Joyce, supra note 105, at 1321 & n.184.
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to imagine a scene in which legislators of the First Congress delivered their
enactments orally, with the text reconstructed and published, if at all, from
the legislators' notes and from the recollections of those present in the
congressional galleries. As far as practices from the founding era indicate, a
statute was considered to be nothing more than its text; a judicial decision,
by contrast, was seen as an exercise of institutional judgment that might be
embodied in a formal published text, but need not be. Early practice
displays a continuum between oral announcements of decisions, draft
manuscripts of opinions, and published judicial opinions. Neither the text
nor the original understanding of Article H1I speaks in any explicit way to
the question of which items on that continuum were to be considered
permissible interpretive sources.
C. Constitutional Structure and Institutional Performance
Although the arguments from the text and original understanding of
Article I prove unpersuasive, there is good reason to think that resort to
judicial history as a legal source would undermine the judiciary's
institutional role in the constitutional structure. The relevant concerns,
while related, can be roughly separated into three major points: that
recourse to judicial history would reduce the quality of the Court's internal
deliberation, that judicial history would become unreliable in a regime that
permits its introduction, and that consulting judicial history would
undermine a complex of rule of law values that the adjudicative process is
structured to promote. 1°8
1. Deliberation
One serious concern is that the widespread introduction of judicial
history as an interpretive source might damage the quality of the Court's
internal deliberations. A pervasive issue in structuring mechanisms of
official deliberation is the tradeoff between internal candor and external
108. I do not include any claim that resort to judicial history would damage the judiciary's
"legitimacy." If the legitimacy claim means that resort to judicial history as a legal source would
bring the judiciary into public disrepute by revealing the indecisiveness, compromise, and error
that inevitably accompany judicial deliberation, then the claim overlooks two critical objections.
First, the extensive modem use of judicial history for biographical and historical purposes has
already brought about that evil, if it is one. The focus here, by contrast, is on the distinct and
concrete harms that would flow from the use of judicial history as an interpretive source. See infra
notes 127-128 and accompanying text. Second, the invocation of "legitimacy" in this debate is
wholly indeterminate. Those who favor fully exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny
argue plausibly that openness, not secrecy, is the precondition of judicial legitimacy. See, e.g.,
Arthur Selwyn Miller & D.S. Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Need for Piercing
the Red Velour Curtain, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 799, 823 (1973) ("We believe that in fact public
esteem (for the Court] would rise if there were to be widespread dissemination of the intricacies
and difficulties, the workload and the burdens of the nine Justices.").
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accountability. The light of publicity permits other institutions, interested
professional and civic associations, and the general public to hold officials
accountable for the content and results of their deliberations. But the glare
of publicity may encourage posturing, insincerity, and calculated silence
where candid discussion of possibilities is needed. A variety of doctrines
and doctrinal debates recognize this tension. To mention only the most
salient example, the deliberative process privilege for presidential advisors,
a species of the broader tradition of executive privilege, recognizes that
protecting the confidentiality of executive branch deliberation will promote
the free exchange of information and ideas as well as better
policymaking. 9
Translating these issues into the judicial context yields two theses.
First, constitutional structure, judicial tradition, and normative
considerations of the judiciary's institutional role all suggest that there are
compelling reasons to protect judicial deliberation from the harms of
excessive publicity, and to protect it to a greater extent, or in different ways,
than legislative and executive deliberations are protected. Second, declaring
judicial history an admissible interpretive source would plausibly inflict just
those sorts of harms.
The constitutional text places a distinct emphasis on the publicity and
openness of legislative deliberation. The Journal Clause of Article I
provides that "[e]ach House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy." 110 The commitment to openness is only
presumptive, for a judgment that particular discussions should be kept
secret is permitted, but the direction of the presumption is significant.'
The Speech and Debate Clause in the same Article, which provides that
"for any Speech or Debate in either House, [congressmen] shall not be
questioned in any other Place," 1 2 should be understood as a corollary of the
109. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The most frequent form of
executive privilege raised in the judicial arena is the deliberative process privilege; it allows the
government to withhold documents and other materials that would reveal 'advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated."' (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318,324 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam))).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
111. A troubling detail for this account is that the Journal Clause does not require that the
public be permitted to attend congressional deliberations. In the period immediately following
ratification, "the Senate chose to operate behind closed doors for several years despite repeated
arguments that the blanket exclusion of the public was inconsistent with the principle of popular
government on which the Constitution was based. Moreover, neither chamber interpreted the
journal provision to require a verbatim transcript of its proceedings." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSnTTUTION IN CONGRESS 10 (1997) (footnotes omitted). Yet it seems clear that the clause was
originally understood to supply a guarantee of democratic accountability. See, e.g., JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTIrnON OF THE UNITED STATES 299 (Ronald D. Rotunda
& John E. Nowak eds., 1987) (1833) ("The object of the whole clause is to ensure publicity to the
proceedings of the legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their
respective constituents.").
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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constitutional commitment to the openness of legislative deliberation. If
legislators are expected to deliberate openly, a risk arises that political
opponents-particularly the executive-may seek to use their words against
them. The Speech and Debate Clause provides a remedy for this ill by
offering legislators immunity from legal penalties for their deliberative
positions." 3 This is, of course, only a partial remedy for the general
problem that the publicity of legislative deliberations may detract from their
quality. But that price is justified by elementary tenets of representative
democracy that should be understood as implicit in Article I. Because
legislators serve not only as policymakers but as elected representatives of
the people, public accountability is a requisite of the process by which the
people monitor and debate the positions their representatives take.
The picture with respect to the Presidency is more nuanced. The
President is subject to several constitutional requirements of reporting and
disclosure, including the duty to "from time to time give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union,"'1 4 and to publish "a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money.""' 5 Presidents have long asserted various forms of executive
privilege, largely on the ground that successful executive deliberation
requires it, and the courts have afforded the privilege qualified
recognition.16 Yet important structural statutes like the Freedom of
Information Act"7 establish that executive privilege and related protections
are properly viewed as exceptions to a general presumption that executive
business should be open to public scrutiny.
Neither the text of the Constitution nor its associated traditions
evidence a similar concern for the public accountability of judicial
operations, leaving aside the historically charged context of the criminal
jury trial." 8 In contrast to Congress, the Court has no constitutional
obligation to keep an official record of its internal deliberations; in contrast
113. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966).
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
115. Id.at art. I,§9, cl. 7.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (recognizing the President's
interest in confidentiality of discussions with advisors, but holding that it was outweighed by the
pressing need for full presentation of relevant evidence in a criminal case).
117. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-557 (1994) (Freedom of Information Act & Government in the
Sunshine Act). The Freedom of Information Act makes executive branch records presumptively
available to the public; the Government in the Sunshine Act opens certain administrative
proceedings to public attendance.
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a... public trial .... "); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44-47 (1984) (holding that
criminal proceedings are presumed open unless the defendant's right to a fair trial is compromised
or the government has a compelling interest in inhibiting the disclosure of sensitive information).
The provision probably has less to do with the judiciary as such than it does with the particular
gravity of criminal proceedings. Cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713 (holding that a valid claim of
executive privilege was outweighed by the need for evidence in a criminal proceeding); Viet D.
Dinh, Book Review, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 346, 355 n.15 (1996) (" [A] case [like Nixon] pits
not Congress against the President, but an individual's rights against governmental interests, and
thus raises different, perhaps more easily answered, questions.").
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to the President, the Court is subject to no constitutional requirements of
reporting or disclosure. 1 9 The Court, moreover, has traditionally guarded
the confidentiality of its deliberations with the utmost care. An elaborate
network of tradition ensures that the Justices' formal deliberations in the
Court's Conference Room are attended only by the Justices themselves, and
that the content of their informal deliberations is not easily discovered. 20
The assumption implicit in these texts and traditions, that judicial
deliberation requires extraordinary protection from the harms of publicity,
has roots in the same historical concern that animates Article llI's guaranty
of life tenure and protection of judicial salaries: a concern that judicial
deliberation should be resolutely nonpolitical and addressed solely to the
merits of judicial business. 2 ' On this view, the harms that publicity can
inflict-insincerity, posturing, cowed silence, and so forth-would be
especially damaging to judicial deliberation because other relevant
institutional rules and incentives attempt to insulate judicial deliberation
from influences, such as the desire to retain office or to receive a salary,
that would produce the same type of distortion. To the extent that
consulting judicial history produced deliberative distortion, it would work
to thwart deeply entrenched constitutional commitments.
But there is an important objection to the concern about deliberation:
Historical and journalistic uses of judicial history are already so widespread
that any incremental harm to deliberation worked by consulting judicial
history as a legal source will be, at most, de minimis. Alexander Bickel
articulated a similar point to justify his decision to publish the draft
opinions of Justice Brandeis. Although Bickel denied that a general practice
119. In this light, it is revealing that the statutes that open executive proceedings to public
scrutiny make exceptions for agency deliberation in an adjudicative capacity. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b(c)(10) (1994) (exempting from disclosure information that concerns "a particular case of
formal agency adjudication"); Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g, 421 U.S. 168, 186
(1975) (holding that reports used in the deliberations of the Renegotiation Board were "precisely
the kind of predecisional deliberative advice and recommendations.., which must remain
uninhibited and thus undisclosed"); Time, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 667 F.2d 329, 334
(2d Cir. 1981) ("The evident sense of Congress was that when a statute required an agency to act
as would a court, its deliberations should be protected from disclosure as a court's would be.").
120. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., What Really Goes on at the Supreme Court, 66 A.B.A. J. 721,
722 (1980).
121. See STORY, supra note 111, at 593 (arguing that without an independent federal
judiciary "[plublic justice.. . will decree... what best suits the opinions of the day").
122. See Fein, supra note 7, at 48 ("Supreme Court confidentiality, at least for a decent
interval, is vital to the unconstrained intramural debate that fathers longheaded decisions. It
assures Justices that the process of intellectual trial and error before a final ruling will not be a
source of embarrassment."); J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Comment on Secrecy and the Supreme
Court, 22 BuFF. L. REv. 837, 838-40 (1973) (detailing various deliberative benefits of
"decisional privacy"); Erwin N. Griswold, Book Review, 69 A.B.A. J. 1506, 1506 (1983) ("One
wonders what effect this sort of presentation of [internal Court] documents, interviews and so on,
so soon after the events, has on freedom of exchange, frankness, trust, common understanding,
even bonhomie, among present and future Justices.... Sunshine can be carcinogenic as well as
antiseptic."). For a general account of the benefits of deliberation to the Court as an institution,
see Kornbauser & Sager, supra note 29, at 100-02.
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of publishing internal judicial materials would distort deliberation, he
argued as well that any possible distortion had already occurred:
[W]hile we are deficient, by and large, in judicial biographies,
enough has long since been gleaned from the private
correspondence of some past Justices, so that, if there is danger that
free intercourse among present ones may be inhibited by
"disclosures" about their predecessors, free intercourse must
already be severely inhibited."2
This argument rings especially true today, when massive biographies of
some Justice or other emerge regularly,124 legal scholars collect and print
the draft opinions and internal memoranda of the Warren, Burger, and even
Rehnquist Courts,"z and the sensitive Marshall Papers provide the
centerpiece for many historical treatments of the Court.126 It seems, then,
that the widespread use of judicial history for historical, biographical, and
predictive uses must already have distorted the Court's deliberations to the
extent such distortion can occur. Any additional distortion arising from the
use of judicial history as a legal source would be trivial.27
But even if the nonlegal uses of judicial history are irremediably
entrenched, there is reason to think that the incremental harm arising from
legal uses of judicial history would be substantial. In a regime permitting
only nonlegal uses of judicial history, judges must posture for the record
only insofar as they wish to protect their general reputation among the
informed public, present or future. In a regime permitting legal uses of
judicial history as well, judges must posture for the internal record in order
to maximize their influence over the future content of the law.
That additional motive for distortion may be quite powerful. A judge
who is largely unconcerned about his reputation among political officials
and journalists-and Article IlI grants life tenure and salary protection
largely to produce such a lack of concern-may be able to resist the
123. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS at ix
(1957).
124. See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994).
125. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHvARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT
(1988); BERNARD ScI-wARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE REHNQUIST COURT (1996);
BERNARD SCHwARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT (1985).
126. See, e.g., N. Bruce Duthu, The Thurgood Marshall Papers and the Quest for a
Principled Theory of Tribal Sovereignty: Fueling the Fires of Tribal/State Conflict, 21 VT. L.
REV. 47 (1996); Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A lisplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions
in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1997); Tushnet, supra note 7 at 473.
127. Of course, the consequence of this sort of argument might simply be that nonlegal uses
of judicial history should be suppressed as well. But those uses lie partially outside the judiciary's
collective institutional control. While the Court might announce by majority vote that judicial
history may not be introduced to interpret an ambiguous opinion, it has thus far proved unable to
prevent the publication of confidential material by former law clerks. See, e.g., EDWARD
LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998). Congress, however, could presumably prohibit such
publication, and state bars could make it a breach of professional ethics.
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temptation to posture in ways that reduce the quality of the Court's internal
deliberation. But a judge who believes that he must posture for the record in
order to exercise influence over the outcomes of specific cases and the
general content of the law may not resist, for the principal way in which
judges qua judges can exercise authority is by affecting the content of legal
doctrines to be applied in litigation or announced through rulemaking. The
pronounced importance of legal influence, among the whole set of goals
that judges seek to attain,"2 may thus cause judges to attempt to exercise
disproportionate influence over the content of the law by strategic action
that reduces the quality of the Court's deliberations and renders judicial
history unreliable. And this picture does not assume aggressively self-
serving action by all judges; so long as some posture for the record, others
may be impelled to do so defensively, in order to protect their share of
influence on the content of legal doctrine. Such considerations suggest that
admitting judicial history as an interpretive source may inflict noticeably
greater harm upon the Court's deliberative processes than have journalistic
and historical uses of judicial history.
2. Reliability
In other domains where resort to official history is debated, a principal
concern has involved the prospective effect that consulting official history
will produce on the official history itself. In the legislative history debate,
textualists argue that the Court's decades-old practice of consulting
legislative history has produced incentives for strategic behavior on the part
of legislators that undermines the reliability of legislative history as
evidence of legislative intent or as interpretive context. Individual
legislators and legislative factions may insert misleading material into the
legislative record-misleading in the sense that the material does not reflect
the intentions of the whole Congress or of the median legislator who voted
for the bill-because they are aware that the judiciary will consult
legislative history and because they wish to influence that judicial
interpretation.29 The same argument surfaces in the debate over presidential
signing statements. Opponents of judicial resort to signing statements argue
128. See LAWRENCE BAuM, THE PUZZLE OF JuDIcIAL BEHAVIOR 37-42 (1997) (reviewing
empirical literature showing that the desire to influence the content of legal policy is a powerful,
although not exclusive, determinant of judicial behavior); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTrruDiNAL MODEL 73 (1993) (arguing that Justices
decide cases on the basis of substantive policy preferences). But cf. Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1,
18 (1993) (stating that the majority of judges "have no great interest in changing (or resisting
change in) law or society").
129. See Manning, supra note 89, at 684-89 (detailing textualist claims that legislative history
supplies unreliable evidence of legislative intent); Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult
Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1015-21 (1992) (describing legislators'
tactics for influencing the content of legislative history).
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that Presidents have, and will, make strategic use of signing statements,
expressing interpretations of enacted statutes that the President could not
persuade the Congress to accept.
130
Reliability concerns about judicial history would assume a similar
form. Justices who are aware that judicial history would be admissible in
subsequent interpretation might seek to influence that interpretation by
strategic creation of judicial history materials. Internal memoranda, opinion
drafts, and other documents might be shaded, or their contents devised, with
a view toward creating an impression that the Justice's preferred disposition
or ruling was broadly accepted, even if the majority or plurality coalition
rejected those positions. Even dissenters could attempt to influence
subsequent interpretation by describing a decision narrowly (or broadly,
depending on what sort of strategic advantage is sought) in internal
documents; a failure of the controlling coalition specifically to rebut the
interpretation could later be argued to represent acquiescence.
The reliability concern appears in some respects weaker when
transposed to the institutional setting of the judiciary. A standard rebuttal to
textualist concerns about manipulation of legislative history claims that
congressional knowledge that legislative history is admissible produces
incentives for members of the enacting coalition to monitor, and rebut,
attempts to manipulate legislative history on the part of other legislators."'
Whatever the persuasive power of the argument, it gains force in the
judicial context. The number of Justices, for example, is sufficiently small
that each might be able to keep abreast of internal memoranda and opinion
drafts and to detect strategic insertions or manipulation as they occur.
Moreover, each Justice sits on each case that comes before the Court.
Unlike the legislature, where mutual reliance by legislators on committees
and other de facto delegates to make policy produces opportunities for
manipulation by subsets of the whole body, 32 the whole Court might be
able to monitor the behavior of each of its members in every case.
But, in other respects, the reliability concern appears stronger in the
judicial context. Judicial papers are subject to the sole control of the judge
who compiles them. There appear to be no institutional checks upon the
ability of Justices to insert potentially misleading material into their papers,
130. See Popkin, supra note 95, at 713-14 (describing "politically manipulative" signing
statements).
131. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 286 ("If speakers and listeners all
know that words spoken in the legislative process are accorded weight by courts and agencies,
then members have an incentive to ensure that the record reflects his or her interpretation of the
statute and that misleading or extreme interpretations do not stand unchallenged."); McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3, 26-28 (describing mechanisms by which legislators can
police manipulation of legislative history by committee members and other delegates).
132. See generally Manning, supra note 89, at 718-19 (arguing that the delegation to
legislative committees or sponsors of the power to make law through legislative history allows
other legislators to avoid responsibility and institutionalizes permanent logrolling).
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and thus into the judicial history record, even if that material was never
exposed to the scrutiny of the whole Court.13 Conversely, material not
placed into a particular Justice's papers must be discovered by cross-
checking the papers of others. It is as if each member of Congress were to
keep a private version of the Congressional Record; legislative history
researchers would face the preliminary difficulty of discovering the full
content of the legislative record even before argument about the
significance of the record could begin. The point is somewhat overstated,
for in a regime that admitted judicial history, institutional mechanisms for
compiling and publishing all the relevant documents might arise. But the
marked individualism of the internal recordkeeping of the federal courts, in
which each judge maintains separate files whose contents are considered
private property, might retard the development of those mechanisms
considerably, and even if it did not, judges would retain all the possibilities
for manipulation of the record that legislators currently possess.
3. Rule of Law Values
A final potential harm arises from the possibility that widespread use of
judicial history as an interpretive source would undermine the rule of law
ideals of the adjudicative process. Although the "rule of law" is a protean
concept, one prominent strand is the idea that the rule of law requires fair
public notice of legal requirements. 34 Just as textualists charge that
legislative history is an inaccessible source of law,135 so too judicial history
might turn out to be an obscure source of interpretive guidance, one
accessible only to legal elites. 136 There is no official system for the
133. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Judicial Biography: Amicus Curiae, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 723,
724 (1995) ("There are numerous instances of self-serving artifacts being created by judges more
with an eye to future historians than to the pressure of the moment-Stone, Frankfurter, and
Douglas are notorious examples."). For debate over a possible example of such behavior,
compare Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 645-51
(1994), which suggests that Justice Felix Frankfurter may have fabricated an internal
memorandum and ascribed it to Justice Owen J. Roberts, with Richard D. Friedman, A
Reaffirmation: The Authenticity of the Roberts Memorandum, or Felix the Non-Forger, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1985 (1994), which disputes Ariens's suggestion.
134. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 214 (arguing that the rule of law requires,
inter alia, that "[a]ll laws should be prospective, open, and clear .... The law must be open and
adequately publicized. If it is to guide people they must be able to find out what it is" (emphasis
omitted)).
135. See Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Kenneth W.
Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 377 ("Resort to
legislative history forces lawyers not only to study the statute, but also to wade through
formidable mounds of materials at federal depositories."); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers, 341 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that legislative history is
inaccessible for many lawyers).
136. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.) ("[Judicial-
history information] provides an unfair advantage to those of us who live and work in Washington
and have easy access to these papers, as opposed to someone in Montana or California who does
not."). Before the development of publicly-financed court reporters, judicial decisions themselves
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gathering, publication, and distribution of internal judicial materials. Even
the system of informal access now in place does not quite provide access to
all. Although scholars have issued several compendia of unpublished
opinions and internal documents,"' some of the Justices' papers are
accessible only to scholars, lawyers, and journalists who meet criteria of
reputability established by the papers' custodians.138
Similar rule-of-law concerns once caused the Court, in the otherwise
unremarkable case of Fayerweather v. Ritch,139 to hold that a judge could
not be put on the stand to testify about the meaning of his own prior judicial
opinion. As the Court put it:
[T]he testimony of the trial judge, given six years after the case had
been disposed of, in respect to the matters he considered and passed
upon, was obviously incompetent.... [N]o testimony should be
received except of open and tangible facts-matters which are
susceptible of evidence on both sides. A judgment is a solemn
record. Parties have a right to rely upon it. It should not lightly be
disturbed, and ought never to be overthrown or limited by the oral
testimony of a judge or juror of what he had in mind at the time of
the decision.14
It is, of course, logically possible to agree with Fayerweather and yet
say that a written record of judicial history should be admissible. After all, a
common combination of rules is to admit legislative history while
excluding legislators' oral testimony, no matter how probative of intention
or context that testimony would be.14 ' But that combination may simply be
incoherent,1 42 and the Court's reasons for excluding judges' testimony also
weigh heavily against judicial history. If, as the quoted passage suggests,
looking beyond the four corners of the judicial text will undermine reliance
and create inaccessible (or unequally accessible) sources of law, it should
hardly matter whether the excluded material is pre-decisional judicial
history or post-decisional judicial testimony.
Perhaps these concerns about accessibility and reliance have little
prospective force, for admission of judicial history as an interpretive source
were often inaccessible in just this way. See Joyce, supra note 105, at 1294-312 (describing
problems of inaccuracy, omission, expense, and inaccessibility in the dissemination of early
Supreme Court opinions). Resort to judicial history would thus threaten to undo the gains in
accessibility, clarity, and uniformity that have accompanied the modem system of reporting
decisions.
137. See supra notes 123, 125.
138. For restrictions on access to the papers of various Justices, see supra note 2.
139. 195 U.S. 276 (1904).
140. Id at 306-07.
141. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1890 & nn.195-98 (describing the rule in most
jurisdictions that legislators may not testify about legislative intent).
142. See id. (arguing that the exclusion of legislators' testimony supports a rule excluding
legislative history); see also infra text accompanying note 161 (discussing implications of
contextualism for rules that preclude legislators' testimony).
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might itself create an increased demand for access on the part of lawyers
and scholars-demand that might produce supply. But the interim
unfairness of unequal access during the transitional period should not be
overlooked, and the causal chain is itself speculative. The Justices' papers
are considered personal property and are placed on the public record only
under conditions set by the donating Justice; there is no guarantee that an
official system for gathering and publishing judicial history, akin to the
Congressional Record, could lawfully be created.1 And, as with legislative
history, judges aware of its legal effect might create judicial history in
sufficient volume to drive the costs of researching it sharply higher, thus
conferring a differential advantage upon large law firms, affluent clients,
and institutional litigants generally. But such arguments as yet have failed
to carry the day in the legislative-history debate."4
This concern with authoritative publication as a requisite of fair notice
and equal access to the law can be articulated from the Court's perspective
as well: The Court's ability to provide legal guidance to lower courts,
nonjudicial officials, and the citizenry might be hampered by resort to
judicial history. If the increasingly rigid and rule-bound character of
Supreme Court opinions causes them increasingly to resemble statutes,145
the development might be explained as an effort by the Court to economize
on the instructions it gives to lower courts and other actors.'46 On this view,
writing its opinions in statute-like form is a technique by which the Court
143. The closest analogy is the Presidential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994),
which regulates official working papers of the President and his staff, and which would probably
survive any separation-of-powers challenges. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President,
90 F.3d 553, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("Presumably in recognition of
Congress's authority to preserve documents of the United States Government, including the
executive branch, the Government does not assert that the Presidential Records Act represents an
unconstitutional intrusion upon the President's exercise of his constitutional duties."); cf Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974), which applied only to the
papers of former President Nixon, against a separation-of-powers challenge). But when in 1993 a
Senate subcommittee held hearings on the legal status of the papers of Supreme Court Justices and
invited the Justices to express their views, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote a letter in return
that stated, on behalf of the whole Court, "[W]e have no hesitancy expressing the opinion that
legislation [respecting the Justices' papers] ... could raise difficult concerns respecting the
appropriate separation that must be maintained between the legislative branch and this Court."
Letter from Chief Justice William Rehnquist to Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (June 7, 1993),
reprinted in Hearing, supra note 1, at 71.
144. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1870-71 (describing arguments that judicial resort to
legislative history imposes burdensome research costs and creates unequal access to the law).
145. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
146. Cf Easterbrook, supra note 42, at 808 ("Longer and more detailed opinions are a
rational and desirable response by a Court that cannot significantly increase the number of cases it
hears but wants to offer guidance on the increasing number of problems it must address.");
Howard, supra note 122, at 841 ("However much seriatim opinions may appeal to the democratic
spirit, effective leadership of a complex legal bureaucracy via case law hinges upon a clear voice
from the top.").
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may provide guidance without having to issue reams of fact-bound opinions
in particular substantive areas."
Resort to judicial history could thwart this practice. Judicial history
might allow litigants to impeach the formally published rules in favor of
different rules mentioned in internal documents, to turn rules into vague
considerations or standards by reading them against the background of the
purposes the Justices hoped the rules would promote, 4 ' and in general to
accomplish with judicial history many of the litigation strategies that parties
use legislative history to accomplish. This is a more persuasive functional
analogue of the implausible formal argument that resort to judicial history
circumvents Article III procedures for judicial decisionmaking. 49 If judicial
opinions have come to resemble statutes for good functional reasons, then
resort to extrinsic material undermines those reasons in the same way that
resort to extrinsic material in statutory interpretation has been said to thwart
the purposes underlying Article I's formalities for statutory enactment. 150
Again, however, legislative history is often used in similar ways, and those
who find such uses of legislative history acceptable should not see the same
uses in the judicial setting as a matter for great concern.
D. Institutional Harms and Interpretive Benefits
All this describes a contingent, quasi-empirical case against admitting
judicial history as an interpretive source. No clean textual or originalist
source forbids its use. But allowing litigants and officials to introduce
judicial history to support their interpretations would predictably inflict
serious harm on the judiciary's processes of deliberation and upon a
complex of rule-of-law values associated with the publication of judicial
texts. This conclusion follows despite the recent widespread use of judicial
history for journalistic, historical, and predictive ends, because the
interpretive use of judicial history would implicate judges' powerful
incentives to influence the future content of the law.
Although it is possible to sketch the nature of these harms to
constitutional structure and institutional role, their magnitudes are hardly
147. See Schauer, supra note 37, at 1469-70 (suggesting that "if one of the functions of a
judicial opinion is guiding lower courts and legally advised actors" then the goal is best achieved
by writing opinions with statute-like precision).
148. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994) ("Rules differ from standards. Sometimes Congress
specifies values or ends, things for the executive or judicial branches to achieve, but often it
specifies means, creating loopholes but greater certainty. Using legislative history and an imputed'spirit' to convert one approach into another dishonors the legislative choice as effectively as
expressly refusing to follow the law." (emphasis omitted)).
149. See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
150. See Manning, supra note 89, at 707 (arguing that judicial resort to legislative history as
an authoritative source disserves the structural objectives promoted by bicameralism and
presentment).
1348 [Vol. 108: 1311
Judicial History
clear. Any assessment of those magnitudes would require an inquiry partly
empirical (e.g., how accessible are the various collections of judicial
history?) and partly predictive (e.g., how much would the admission of
judicial history decrease the reliability of judicial history records?).
Moreover, even if the magnitudes were completely specified, there remains
the normative question whether the occurrence of these harms is an
acceptable price to pay for the interpretive benefits that recourse to judicial
history would confer. That question turns on difficult assessments of the
rate and magnitude of interpretive error and the cost of litigation and
adjudication, both in a regime that admits judicial history and in a regime
that does not."'
Yet there is no escaping such judgments; to admit judicial history
would make them in precisely the same way, just in the opposite direction.
And there are several supplementary reasons for thinking that the decision
to exclude judicial history is the right one. First, one powerful argument
against admitting judicial history is that courts currently do not do so.
Despite Holy Trinity's sharp break with the traditional exclusion of
legislative history, courts choosing an interpretive regime under conditions
of grave empirical uncertainty ought not to disturb settled rules unless the
costs of the status quo appear intolerable. Second, when interpretive
benefits are weighed against institutional harms, the point that resort to
judicial history may often be unnecessary comes into its own. Judicial
opinions, despite their increasingly rule-like character," 2 still supply more
interpretive context than does statutory text; and even under current practice
other adjudicative materials, such as litigants' briefs, are admissible to
supply whatever additional interpretive guidance is needed.'53 If for these
reasons the need for judicial history is sufficiently small, the potential
institutional harms described above need not be very great to support the
total exclusion of judicial history. On some such mix of institutional and
practical grounds the current untheorized practice of excluding judicial
history thus seems defensible.
IV. JUDICIAL HISTORY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND OFFICIAL HISTORY
The running debates over the use of official history in constitutional,
statutory, and treaty interpretation have not yet extended to the internal
materials created by the judicial branch. But thinking about the judicial
151. Cf. Cass. R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 548
(1997) (book review) ("Whether it makes sense to use legislative history depends on such issues
as the simple costs of using the history, the likelihood that it will increase rather than decrease
errors, the availability of other more reliable sources of meaning, and the consequences for the
legislature itself of using legislative history or not using it.").
152. See Schauer, supra note 37, at 1407.
153. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
1999] 1349
The Yale Law Journal
history puzzle promises to provide some critical traction in those debates.
By supplying a doctrinal anomaly against which to test our commitments
and intuitions, the judicial history puzzle illuminates the conditions for
useful argument about other problems of official history. This Part
elaborates upon those conditions and illustrates their application with a
comparison between judicial history and legislative history.
Two conditions for useful argument in these areas deserve particular
attention. First, plausible arguments about official history problems will be
local rather than global. They will stem not from a universal approach to
official history as such, but rather from detailed local claims, both formal
and institutional, applicable to particular categories of official history.
Second, plausible arguments will obey the constraint of consistency: No
participant should offer an argument in one official history debate that, if
transposed to another debate and accepted there, would contradict the
position the participant holds in that other debate. These two conditions are
perfectly compatible, indeed complementary. The consistency constraint
operates to eliminate official history arguments based upon highly abstract
principles that inevitably fail to explain a good portion of the interpretive
landscape. In this way, the consistency criterion presses official history
debates toward local solutions. Taken together, these conditions suggest an
unexciting but attainable picture, one in which positions on particular types
of official history will gradually be connected up in a linked series of
comparisons that promises to sort the plausible views about official history
from the implausible ones.
A. Localism
In principle, any particular official history problem could be resolved
by the top-down application of a universal approach to official history, with
that approach itself rooted in some general theory of legal interpretation.
For example, it might be claimed that legal interpretation is just a species of
linguistic interpretation, that linguistic interpretation usually requires
extensive consideration of linguistic context,"' that official history supplies
such context, and that official history should therefore be generally
admissible. As discussed, similar views about interpretive context would at
least presumptively make judicial history a perfectly ordinary and
admissible source.
154. Cf. Larry M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases,
1997 WIs. L. REV. 235, 251-62 (arguing that textualism in statutory interpretation fails because
human linguistic and cognitive capacities demand more interpretive context than textualism
permits).
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But it seems unlikely in the extreme that any such universal approach
will prove plausible-putting aside highly abstract universal criteria that
themselves produce a contextual approach, such as the truism that courts
should consult official history when the benefits of doing so outweigh the
costs. No participant in the current local debates about particular forms of
official history adopts such an all-or-nothing stance; those who disfavor
resort to legislative history draw heavily upon originalist materials,'55 and
everyone thinks that judicial history at least should be excluded.15 6 Official
history problems arise across an exceedingly broad range of legal domains,
ranging from constitutions, statutes, and treaties to presidential orders and
judicial opinions and rules. 157 Any global approach to official history would
have to be rooted in an interpretive theory nearly as broad as law itself.
The alternative to a global approach to official history is a contextual
approach, under which official-history problems would be resolved on the
basis of particular claims about particular types of official history, the legal
texts to which that history is a precursor, and the institutions or officials
who generate both. These contextual judgments might, of course, be
implemented through rules about categories of judicial history rather than
through case-by-case adjudication. The point is that their derivation would
rest, not upon global theories of interpretation, but upon formal,
institutional, and empirical claims of a local character.
The judicial history problem illustrates the advantages of this sort of
local solution. The law's untheorized exclusion of judicial history
contradicts several of the standard global principles, such as intentionalism
and contextualism, that are often invoked to resolve official history debates;
under those principles judicial history ought to be admissible. The general
accounts overlook the previously discussed formal and institutional
justifications for the practice of excluding judicial history, justifications
generated by detailed analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions and
by quasi-empirical assessments of judicial behavior.
B. Consistency
Scholars working in various domains of legal interpretation, in both
public and private law, have begun to compare problems of official history
across those domains with a view to testing for consistency of position.
Recent scholarship asks whether a textualist position that would exclude
legislative history from statutory interpretation, or at least deny it any
155. See Eskridge, supra note 49, at 1301 (noting that textualists in statutory interpretation
often use originalist materials in constitutional interpretation).
156. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 5-11, 92-96 and accompanying text (supplying examples of judicial
resort to these forms of official history).
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authoritative weight, is consistent with originalism in constitutional
interpretation.15 Legislative history has also been compared to other forms
of official history, such as the travauxpreparatoires that courts draw upon
to inform treaty interpretation.159 The consistency at issue in these
comparisons is methodological, not substantive. Localism means that
resolutions of particular debates can take account of relevant institutional
differences that might well yield different prescriptions about judicial use of
originalist materials, legislative history, judicial history, and so forth.
Rather, consistency demands only that no participant should offer an
argument in one official history debate that, if transposed to another debate
and accepted there, would contradict the position the participant holds in
that other debate.
While that requirement is minimal, it has sufficient bite to condemn a
fair amount of argumentation in several of the particular debates about
official history. One example is the comparison between legislative history
and judicial history touched upon in Parts I and II. Currently the most
popular defense of legislative history is the position that interpreters need
contextual material to read legal texts correctly.1 6' But the judicial history
puzzle supplies a consistency-based argument against that position. If the
arguments adduced to support the admission of legislative history also
entail that judicial history ought to be admissible as well, and if the
exclusion of judicial history is an entrenched commitment of our
interpretive practices, then the only interpretive regime that accords with
our commitments is one that excludes both judicial and legislative history.
The supporter of legislative history might choose either of two paths
out of this quandary; both illustrate the virtues of localism and consistency.
One response might simply be to embrace the use of judicial history as an
interpretive source. But it surely counts against such a position that it would
effect a sweeping transformation of traditional interpretive practice. And
the same reckless logic would undermine other fundamental limits on
official history. Legislators or judges, for example, may not take the stand
158. See generally Eskridge, supra note 49 (providing an extended comparison of the two
categories); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in
Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1337-40 (1998) (sketching
permissible textualist uses of originalist materials).
159. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 1021 (1994) ("The textualist, intentionalist, and teleological approaches to finding treaty
meaning roughly match up with the prevailing schools in statutory construction."); Michael P.
Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 743-48 (1998) (comparing
legislative history and travaux under the rubric of "drafting history"). Other recent literature
crosses the divide between public and private law by comparing legislative history with
contractual parol evidence. See Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"?
The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1145, 1184-85
(1998) (comparing the negotiating history of contracts with the legislative history of statutes); Eric
A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 533, 573 (1998) (same).
160. See supra note 53.
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to testify about the context of their official proceedings or deliberations,
even though such testimony would presumably provide a wealth of
interpretive aid. 6' The abstract premises of intentionalism and
contextualism make such limitations inexplicable.
A second route out of the quandary would be to add side constraints
that explain the disparate treatment of legislative and judicial history. For
example, the supporter of legislative history might argue that resort to
judicial history will distort judicial deliberation, as previously suggested,
and then add that resort to legislative history will not distort legislative
deliberation (or at least will not distort it in a normatively unacceptable
way).' 62 But if the side constraint of concern for deliberation is all that
explains a major asymmetry in our interpretive practices, then the side
constraint is all that matters, and the requirement of consistency has forced
the argument out of the abstract realm of interpretive first principles, such
as "context" or "intention," and down to the details of specific institutions
and their deliberative processes.
Consistency arguments run the other way as well. Textualists who
would exclude legislative history on the ground that Article I's restrictions
upon legislative self-delegation implicitly preclude its use as an
authoritative source,163 or on the ground that judges lack competence to
handle legislative-history materials," must supply some different ground
for opposition to judicial history. But this sort of investigation of localized
formal and institutional arguments usefully shifts the debate away from
abstractions about intent and context. Those abstract grounds for resolving
particular debates (such as the "context" argument for legislative history)
prove difficult to reconcile with commitments about other forms of official
history (such as the exclusion of judicial history) that are too deeply
entrenched to abandon.
In many respects this combination of consistency and localism
produces an unassuming program for interpretive theory. Rather than
supporting a global agenda for developing a top-down account of official
history, the two conditions support a set of local agendas for developing
arguments about particular categories of history and comparing them
against arguments from other debates, in the hopes that a long series of such
comparisons will sift the plausible accounts of official history from the
161. See supra note 8 (describing traditional doctrines that exclude legislators' and judges'
testimony).
162. This position is used as an illustration; I do not endorse it. On the merits of the
institutional arguments, there are reasons to fear that judicial recourse to legislative history harms
legislative deliberation a great deal. This is an implication of Jeremy Waldron's observation that a
large and diverse group of legislators must rely upon the formal text of a proposed bill, which
"provides a focus for the ordering of deliberation at every stage." Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity
of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REv. 633, 663 (1995).
163. See Manning, supra note 89, at 695 ("Textualism, in short, purports to operate as a
nondelegation doctrine.").
164. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1860-63.
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implausible. Such a process is surely less dramatic than choosing among
global theories of interpretation and of official history. But it also sets a
goal that promises to be attainable, and in the unsettled realm of interpretive
theory that is no mean thing.
V. CONCLUSION
Current interpretive doctrine displays an interesting asymmetry. Courts
and other interpreters sometimes consult the internal official history of the
Constitution, statutes, and treaties as an aid to the interpretation of those
documents. But they do not consult the internal history of judicial opinions
or judicially-promulgated rules, despite the existence of a corpus of
"judicial history" that resembles legislative history and might be used for
some of the same interpretive purposes. While the puzzling exclusion of
judicial history ultimately proves justifiable on structural and institutional
grounds, the judicial history problem illuminates how the law ought to treat
other categories of official history. Interpreters should move beyond
abstract talk about interpretive first principles, such as intention and
interpretive context, for those premises would upset settled interpretive
commitments such as the exclusion of judicial history. Rather, interpreters
should resolve debates over particular categories of official history by
reference to local formal and institutional claims and then test those
resolutions for consistency against commitments in other areas.
1354 [Vol. 108:1311
